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Blücher's Army 1813-1815

Text by
PETER YOUNG
Colour plates by
MICHAEL ROFFE



MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

EDITOR: PHILIP WARNER

Blücher's Army 1813-1815

Text by BRIGADIER PETER YOUNG
DSO, MC, MA, FSA, FRHist.S, FRGS

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I wish to pay tribute to the uniform plates and notes of F. and G. Bourdier, those of Richard Knötel and to the work of my old friend the late Winand Aerts. I am, in addition, much indebted to my friend Marcus Hinton for permission to use plates drawn for his series entitled *Prints Militaire*. To my Wife, who since 1956 has typed all my deathless prose, I can only apologize for inflicting yet another burden upon her.

PETER YOUNG

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Introduction

In the long struggle with Revolutionary France and with Napoleon, Prussia's share was by no means pre-eminent. In successive coalitions she either had no part at all or played second fiddle to Austria, Great Britain and Russia. But in the final campaigns from 1813 to 1815 she threw caution and pedantry to the winds and fell upon the French with all the fervour and energy of a modern *blitzkrieg*. This was due to one man above all, Field-Marshal Prince Blücher, 'the avenging thunderbolt', whose dynamic energy would have been remarkable in an officer of half his years. The most pugnacious of generals, the most loyal of colleagues, Blücher led or drove his raw regiments to the fight with relentless vigour. The fumbling uncertainty displayed by the Prussian High Command in 1806 was not for him. His army of 1813–15, though it contained perhaps half the officer corps that had fought at Jena and Auerstädt, was nothing like the creaking machine that Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick had inherited from his uncle Frederick the Great. The soldiers of the War of Liberation showed up poorly on the parade ground, but they made up in enthusiasm for any lack of the old Prussian precision in matters of drill and turn-out.

This book does not concentrate on the Waterloo campaign to the exclusion of the campaigns of 1813 and 1814, for it was at Dennewitz, on the Katzbach and at Leipzig that the Prussian Army recovered the self-respect which it had lost not so much on the battlefields of Jena and Auerstädt as in the shameful surrenders that followed. The Prussian Army of 1813 was very different, not only in appearance but in spirit, from that of 1806. But it was the same as that of 1815: it was in fact Blücher's Army. If rather more detail is here given about the campaign of 1815 than about those of the War of Liberation it is because to the English-speaking reader the events of Napoleon's last campaign have an inexhaustible fascination. It is moreover salutary for the British student of military affairs to recall that in the majority of our great battles we have had the support of trusted allies. Could Marlborough have won Blenheim without Prince Eugene? Could Wellington have won Waterloo without Blücher? Those who have fought against the Germans in this century have generally acknowledged that they were resolute and valiant enemies. It is as well sometimes to recall that in times past they also showed themselves to be devoted and hard-fighting allies.

P.Y.



Napoleon receiving the Queen of Prussia at Tilsit. From the painting by Nicolas-Louis-François Gosse
The Treaty of Tilsit reduced Prussia to the status of a second-class power

Chronology

1806

14 Oct. Battles of Jena and Auerstädt.
27 Oct. Napoleon enters Berlin.
24 Nov. Blücher surrenders near Lübeck.

1807

8 Feb. Battle of Eylau, General Lestocq's Corps takes part.

1809

31 May Schill's death at Stralsund.
5–6 July Battle of Wagram.

1810

19 July Death of Queen Louise of Prussia.

1812

30 Dec. The Convention of Tauroggen; Yorck withdraws the Prussian contingent from the *Grande Armée*.

1813

23 Feb. Frederick William III determines to break with Napoleon.
13 Mar. Prussia declares war on France.
2 May Battle of Lützen.
20–21 May Battle of Bautzen; Napoleon drives Wittgenstein from the field.
21 June Battle of Vitoria (Spain).
28 June Scharnhorst dies of a wound received at Grossgörschen.
12 Aug. Austria declares war.
23 Aug. Battle of Grossbeeren; Bernadotte defeats Oudinot.
26 Aug. Battle of the Katzbach; Blücher routs Macdonald.
26–27 Aug. Battle of Dresden; Napoleon wins a tactical victory.
29–30 Aug. Battle of Kulm; the Allies annihilate Vandamme's Corps.
6 Sept. Battle of Dennewitz.
16–19 Oct. The Battle of the Nations: Leipzig; Napoleon is heavily defeated.
30–31 Oct. Battle of Hanau; Napoleon defeats Wrede's Bavarians.
21 Dec. The Allies cross the Rhine.

1814

Jan.–Apr. The Campaign of France.
11 Apr. Abdication of Napoleon.

1815

1 Mar. Napoleon lands near Cannes.
16 June Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras.
18 June Battles of Waterloo and Wavre.
22 June Second abdication of Napoleon.
1 July Combat at Versailles.

'Tempting Providence', 1806. The Prussian Noble Guard sharpen their swords on the steps of the French Embassy in Berlin. Watercolour by F. de Myrbach





Queen Louisa reviewing the Prussian Army in 1806. Watercolour by F. de Myrbach

Organization

'Organization is a necessary evil.'
VON CLAUSEWITZ

In 1806 the old Prussian Army inherited from Frederick the Great was shattered. The battles of Jena and Auerstädt broke its body: with the shameful surrenders of Küstrin and other fortresses it seemed that its soul also had fled. By the Treaty of Paris (1808) the Prussian Army was limited to a strength of 42,000.

In 1804 the King of Prussia had 9,752,731 subjects living in his domains, of whom 4,860,747 were men. The Canton system of recruiting permitted numerous exemptions; but even so, in 1805, there were 2,320,122 men liable to military service. By the Peace of Tilsit (9 July 1807) the population of Prussia was reduced to 4,938,000. The loss of rich provinces reduced her territory from 5,570 to 2,877 square miles. Of her fortresses only Graudenz, Pillau, Kolberg, Glatz, Silberburg and Cosel had Prussian garrisons. The rest were all garrisoned by the French. In less than a year Prussia, from being the foremost among the German military powers, had become one of the least.

The mobilization of 1813 began on 9 February when the royal authorities in the temporary capital at Breslau declared conscription for the regular army. Earlier still, on 28 January 1813 an Armament Commission had been set up to supervise the mobilization and expansion of the army. Its members included Hardenberg, Scharnhorst and Hake. It was on that date that Scharnhorst resumed his old post at the head of the War Department.

Royal orders for mobilization were issued on 12 January, 1 February, and 2 and 18 March 1813. The first, ironically enough, was in response to a French request for additional troops. It gave a pretext for bringing regiments up to establishment size and for calling up artillery, pioneers and reservists.

By an instruction of 7 February it was laid down that subalterns who had served in 1806 and 1807 were eligible for immediate promotion, while any capable cadet, or suitable N.C.O. could be commissioned forthwith.



'Off to the wars!' 1813. Prussian volunteers

On 3 February Hardenberg had announced the formation of Volunteer Jäger units, appealing to the propertied classes, who were exempted from conscription, to volunteer. This measure brought in young men of good family, who were officer material. In the first months of 1813, 2,798 volunteered and by the summer the total had reached 7,800. This was not enough to prove that the best of the nation were rising spontaneously to throw off the yoke of Napoleon, but it was quite enough to provide a valuable pool of subaltern officers.

At first the Jäger, who were required to equip themselves, were given preferential treatment. But few commanding officers believed in anything but the strictest discipline, and they had the Volunteers whipped with the same impartiality that they bestowed on ordinary recruits.[1]

The reformers worked hard to ensure that every able-bodied man should be liable to conscription, and achieved their end in the teeth of a popular press which declared that the country was not ready for such a burden, and that the free Prussian lands were becoming a police state. But so far as the military authorities were concerned, a man was fit if his front teeth met firmly enough to enable him to bite his cartridge.

Prince Eugène de Beauharnais withdrew his French troops from Berlin on 4 March. By that time the alliance with Russia had been signed (28 February) and on 16 March King Frederick William felt bold enough to declare war on the French Empire. Next day he made his appeal, *An Mein Volk*, by which he set the tone of the war. Henceforth the struggle was not dynastic but national. In all these measures we may discern the hand of Scharnhorst, who principally paved the way for Blücher's campaigns.

The opening of hostilities on 16 March 1813 found the Prussians with the following resources:

FIELD ARMY

1,776 officers; 66,963 men; 20,105 horses; 213 guns.

MEDICAL, TRAIN AND TECHNICAL TROOPS

2,643 men; 3,625 horses.

SECOND-LINE TROOPS

615 officers; 32,642 men; 650 horses; 56 guns.

GARRISON TROOPS

398 officers; 22,277 men; 1,743 horses; 148 train (*Knechte*).



Garde-Jäger Battalion. Green; red facings; gold lace. (R. Knötel)



Left: Queen Louisa of Prussia; right: Frederick William III of Prussia. (Engraved by T. Johnson)

The total amounted to 127,394,[2] but half the men were recruits without much training. There was little artillery; muskets were hard to come by, and there were not enough horses. Flints for muskets were so scarce that the Berlin porcelain factory was ordered to make *ersatz* ones.

On 21 April a *Landsturm* force was brought into being. It was to be a guerrilla army, armed with flails, rakes, pikes and axes, and was to carry out a scorched-earth policy upon the approach of the enemy. It was not uniformed – indeed uniform for the *Landsturm* was expressly forbidden.

Students of uniform will observe that whereas most units of Blücher's Army wore Prussian blue, many of their shakos and cartridge-belts had a decidedly English appearance. But arms are even more important than uniforms and it is not too much to say that without English weapons the Prussian Army would have been on the same footing as the *Landsturm*. By the end of June 1813 British arms were arriving in the Baltic ports. By 15 July 40,000 muskets and $8\frac{1}{2}$ million cartridges had been received. Cannon, powder, ball, wagons and uniforms arrived in quantities. Altogether the Prussian Army was issued at least 113,000 English muskets in time for the autumn campaign of 1813. They were needed, for by June 1813 the Prussian Army numbered nearly 150,000 men. The Landwehr, recruiting vigorously, raised a total of 120,000 men by mid-July:[3] Lithuania, East and West Prussia to the Vistula, 20,000 men; Prussia west of the Vistula, 6,620; Silesia, 49,974; New Mark, 7,941; Electoral Mark Brandenburg, 20,560; Pomerania, 15,409.

In the 1815 campaign the Prussian Army was organized into Headquarters and four army corps. There were no divisions. Each corps had four infantry brigades, each about the same size as a French infantry division. Each corps had two or three brigades of cavalry and between six and eleven batteries of artillery as well as a company of pioneers.

The corps varied in strength:[4]

	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*
Infantry	29,135	27,002	22,275	27,459
Cavalry	2,175	4,471	1,981	3,321
Gunners	1,054	1,501	999	1,307
Guns	88	80	48	88
Pioneers	204	74	63	151
Total	32,568	33,048	25,318	32,238

It will be observed that Thielmann's Corps (III) was much weaker than the other three.

The Leaders

FELDMARSCHALL VORWÄRTS

THE AVENGING THUNDERBOLT

(Das Heilige Donnerwetter)

GEBHARD LEBERECHT VON BLÜCHER (1742–1819) was a native of Rostock, brought up in Mecklenburg. When he was 16 he obtained a commission in the Swedish service, but was soon taken prisoner by the Prussian Colonel von Belling, who formed a high opinion of him and took him into his own regiment. His pious commanding officer's prayer was: 'Thou seest, dear Heavenly Father, the sad plight of thy servant Belling. Grant him soon a nice little war that he may better his condition and continue to praise Thy name. Amen.' It would be strange if his attitude did not influence his subalterns.

Blücher is said to have been of a quarrelsome nature and fond of drinking and gambling. He also seems to have been somewhat heavy-handed and when stationed in Poland is alleged to have tortured a priest in order to extract a confession. At a time when Frederick the Great wished the Poles to believe him their benefactor this was unwise. Blücher was passed over for promotion and, resigning his commission, was told by the King that he might go to the devil. He soon regretted his action and repeatedly applied to return to the service; but in vain. Not until Frederick died in 1786 was Blücher, now aged 44, reinstated. He was given the rank of major in his old regiment. In 1793 he was serving as a colonel under Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, taking part in a number of sieges and skirmishes. In May 1794, aged 52, he was promoted major-general. He was already known for his energy and his love of excitement: 'from drilling his squadron, which was quartered at a distance, he would proceed to a hare hunt or a gay dinner and that same night, perhaps, to a surprise attack on the enemy, or to the laying of an ambush for the next morning.

Silesian Rifle Battalion. Green, black facings with red piping, yellow metal buttons. From 1809 to 1812 the battalion was in garrison at Liegnitz. The Silesian Rifle Battalion was evidently an excellent unit. It had been formed in 1808 from certain light companies which had defended Glatz in 1807. In 1813 it saw a great deal of fighting, notably at Kulm, where it took two French colours. At Vauchamps in 1814 two companies under Captain (later Adjutant-General) von Neumann fixed sword-bayonets and repulsed a superior force of the cavalry of Napoleon's Guard. In 1815 the Silesian Rifles served in Zieten's (I) Corps. (R. Knötel)

Having temporarily silenced the enemy he would enjoy himself at Frankfort gambling or going to the theatre.'[5] By 1801 he was a lieutenant-general.

In 1802 Prussia was granted a slice of the bishopric of Münster, and Blücher was given command of the occupying force. Baron Stein, the famous statesman and reformer, was president of the organization commission, and between them they made such a good job of their unpopular task that the estates and the ecclesiastical authorities asked the King of Prussia to make Blücher their governor. Somewhat surprisingly they had been impressed by the old hussar's 'knowledge of local affairs, his honesty and uprightness, his amiability and charitableness, his cleverness and penetration, and his ability to keep the peace between soldiers and civilians'.[6]

When in 1803 Mortier occupied Hanover, Blücher hastened to Berlin, only to find to his disgust that his government's attitude was one of indifference. 'All the misfortunes of Germany and of the Prussian monarchy', he was to declare later, 'are traceable to this event, at the moment so insignificant.' From this time the words, 'We must fight France', were constantly on Blücher's lips.

Feldmarschall Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, Prince of Wahlstadt. Engraving by G. Kruell

At Auerstädt (14 October 1806), at the head of his squadron, he had his horse shot under him. After extricating himself he asked the King to let him lead the Gendarmes to the charge. No sooner had he been given permission than a counter-order bade him cover the withdrawal of Hohenlohe. This he succeeded in doing. When Hohenlohe surrendered at Prenzlau Blücher fought on, cutting his way through to the Hansa city of Lübeck, where after a stiff fight he was compelled to surrender, though he was soon to be exchanged for General (later Marshal) Victor.

Scharnhorst, who had been with Blücher in the retreat to Lübeck, had discerned in him the highest military qualities. No other general, in his opinion, was fit to head the army of resurgent Prussia. 'You are our leader and our hero,' wrote Scharnhorst, 'even if you have to be carried before or behind us on a litter.' But, afflicted by the disasters of 1806, Blücher fell sick in body and mind. Boyen tells us that he 'actually believed that he was pregnant with an elephant', to which Scharnhorst's retort was that Blücher 'must lead though he have a hundred elephants inside of him'.

In 1809 Major von Schill, one of the heroes of the defence of Colberg (1806) rose against the French. He was defeated and killed at Stralsund. Eleven of his officers were court-martialled and shot. A number were sent captive to France, branded and compelled to serve in the galleys. Blücher, though in his public utterances he disavowed Schill's action, took some 900 of the survivors under his protection and in consequence was reprimanded by the King. For a second time he resigned from the Prussian service.

To Gneisenau he wrote:

'God knows with what grief I quit a state and an army in which I have been for fifty years. It breaks my heart to abandon a master for whom I would have given my life a thousand times. But all the same, by God in Heaven, I will stand no more slights! I will not be treated as a super-annuated commander. Younger men shall not be placed ahead of me! If the King does not make up his mind, if we take no steps to break our

Scharnhorst. From a medallion by L. Posch

chains – well, those who will may wear them, not I! I have sacrificed everything for the state; I leave it as one quits the world, poor, naked, and bare. But I shall go, wherever it be, with a quiet conscience and accompanied by many honest folk.'

It is said that he actually offered his sword to the Austrian Archduke Charles, but the King assured Blücher of his continued confidence and promoted him general of cavalry. Gradually the old man's wrath subsided. Still, throughout 1809 he was urging the King to throw in his lot with Austria and after Wagram he did not hesitate to reproach Frederick William for not having done so.

During the debacle of 1806 and all the misfortunes that followed, Prussian morale, albeit a feeble flame, had been sustained to some extent by the gracious, brave and charming Queen Louise, who was twice the man that Frederick William was. Her sad and early death deprived the Prussian court of its chief ornament. It provoked a characteristic explosion from General Blücher:

'I am as if struck by lightning! The pride of womanhood has departed from the earth. God in Heaven, it must be that she was too good for us! . . . How is it possible for such a succession of misfortunes to fall on a state! In my present mood I should be pleased to hear that the earth had caught fire at all four corners!'

At this time Blücher was in command at Colberg, busy with the fortifications and with training reserves. The French consul at Stettin discovered that he had 7,000 men more than he was allowed and Napoleon's ambassador demanded his dismissal. On 11 November 1811 the King wrote explaining this in as friendly a fashion as he ventured to, sending him 2,000 thalers for his travelling expenses, and adding, 'I have it in mind to place you in a position to renew your activity so soon as there shall be an opportunity.' At 69 Blücher can scarcely have thought it likely that he would be re-employed.

Blücher withdrew to Stargard where he spent the winter of 1811–12. While the French were invading Russia he remained unemployed, complaining that, with Prussia subjected by treaty to France, 'All is lost and honour too . . .' But with the news that the *Grande Armée* had been crippled excitement rose. Early in January 1813 Blücher wrote to Scharnhorst:

'I am itching in every finger to grasp the sword. If his Majesty, our King, if all the other German princes, if the nation as a whole do not now rise and sweep from German territory the whole rascally French brood together with Napoleon and all his crew, then it seems to me that no German is any longer worthy of the name. It is now the moment to do what I was already advising in 1809; namely, to call the whole nation to arms and to drive out those of the princes who refuse and who place themselves in opposition even as we shall drive out Bonaparte. This is not a question of Prussia alone but of reuniting the whole German Fatherland and rebuilding the nation.'

What Blücher was bluntly expressing in his soldierly prose, was already being sung by the poets of the War of Liberation, among them Moritz Arndt:

A path for freedom! Purify the soil!
The German soil, oh cleanse it with thy blood!

At first Frederick William hoped to preserve peace with France on the principle of 'Live and let live', but by 23 February Scharnhorst, Hardenberg and others had made up his mind for him. He would venture to break with Napoleon. Three days later he wrote to Blücher:

'I have determined to place you in command of those troops that are to be the first to take the

field. I order you accordingly to mobilize here as speedily as possible. The importance of the commission thus entrusted to you will convince you of the confidence I feel in your military experience and in your patriotism.'

Blücher's Army of Silesia took the field early in April, drove in the French outposts, crossed the Elbe and set up his headquarters in Dresden. From the first battle of the campaign, Lützen (2 May), his mixture of iron nerve and dash built up the Blücher legend.

'Blücher, with the utmost imperturbability, remained, for the most part at points of more or less danger, indefatigably smoking his pipe. When it was smoked to the end he would hold it out behind him and call "Schmidt!" whereupon his orderly would hand him one freshly filled and the old gentleman smoked away at his ease. Once we halted for a time quite near a Russian battery and a shell fell right in front of us. Everyone shouted: "Your Excellency, a shell!"

'"Well, leave the hellish thing alone!" said Blücher calmly. There he stood until it burst; then and not till then did he change his position.'

About 4 o'clock he led a desperate attack on the corps of Ney and Marmont and in the fighting that followed his horse was shot under him and he was hit in the side by a bullet. As the surgeon examined the wound Blücher feared the worst, but, learning that it was not serious, scarcely had the patience to let himself be bandaged before mounting and dashing back into the fray. In the last cavalry attack, made after dark by a man of 71 who had been in the saddle since dawn, he got within 200 yards of Napoleon's command post, and so imposed upon the Emperor's imagination that he let the Allies depart unmolested. Lützen was not much of a victory for the French, who lost 22,000 men to the 11,500 casualties of the Allies. As Blücher elegantly expressed it, 'The French may make wind as much as they please; they are not likely to forget the 2nd of May.'

The Tsar, full of admiration, bestowed the Cross of St George upon Blücher for his services on this occasion, speaking of his 'splendid habit of always being present at the point of greatest danger. . . .' But despite his bravery at Lützen, Bautzen and Hanau the old gentleman had his critics. He was too old; he was out of date; he had been out of his mind; he had little experience of handling large forces; he knew little of strategy or tactics. He could not converse with his Russian colleagues either in Russian or French. He was fond of gambling and of the bottle.

Even if all or some of these charges contained an element of truth Blücher's virtues outweighed them. He alone had the will-power, the drive, the optimism, the sheer guts to carry his raw army forwards. His quickness of decision, his presence of mind under fire, more than made up for his contempt for planning and cartography. With a Chief of Staff like Gneisenau to work out the details it was a positive advantage to the Prussians that Blücher did not concern himself with the minutiae of military administration.

'Gneisenau, being my chief of staff and very reliable, reports to me on the manœuvres that are



The Brandenburg Cuirassier Regiment. The regiment was raised after Tilsit from the remains of six heavy cavalry regiments, and fought in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 at Bautzen, Dresden, Kulm, Leipzig and elsewhere. In full dress a white coatee was worn. On campaign officers wore the blue jacket known as the *leibrock* and the men wore a blue *litewka*, with red facings. With the white coatee light blue facings were worn. The saddle-cloths are red with yellow trimmings. (R. Knötel)

to be executed and the marches that are to be performed. Once convinced that he is right I drive my troops through hell towards the goal and never stop until the object has been achieved – yes, though officers of the old school may sulk and bellyache to the point of mutiny.'

Above all Blücher had the great virtue that, while he detested Napoleon, he was not impressed by him. 'Let him do his worst,' said he after Bautzen, 'he is really nothing but a dunderhead.'

Blücher for his part was not merely a blunt *sabreur*. Arndt, who met him in April 1813, saw concentrated in his face 'the cunning of a hussar, the play of features sometimes extending up into his eyes, and something of a marten listening for its prey'.

Wenzel Krimer (1795–1834), an Austrian who fought in Lützow's Freikorps at Lützen and Bautzen tells us something of Blücher's technique of command.

Trooper, Lifeguard, 1809. White uniform, red facings and grey overalls. From a drawing by I. Wolf, engraved by F. Jügel

'. . . Blucher, although he might readily overlook indiscipline among brave soldiers, came down very severely on weaklings and usually punished them by his caustic humour or by personal example. Thus it frequently happened that, if he met stragglers along the line of march, he would dismount and proceed on foot, with them walking in front of him. Or he would order them to stick wisps of straw in their shakos and they would then be escorted by cavalrymen to their regiments, decorated as men of straw.

'Whenever he passed a battalion which he knew to be a brave one, he would not allow his staff to take up the middle of the road. So as not to impede those on the march, he preferred to ride to one side, and he greeted everyone cordially and made enquiries about everything. If there was a shortage of rations, we were certain to find an adequate supply all ready laid out in the open street in the next village: every man as he passed by was allowed to help himself as he liked.

'Blücher's usual greeting was "Good morning, children!" even in the evening. To this the soldiers would respond with, "Hurrah, Father Blücher!"

'He had his weaknesses, certainly, but these did little damage to his many virtues. It often happened that, as soon as evening came or when otherwise in bivouac, a drum had to be brought over, and he would throw dice with the first officers who came along. If he won a few thalers, he was as delighted as a child and would stroke his grey moustache and grin; while if he lost (and he often lost a great deal of money) he would laugh at himself. But, strange to relate, the very thing he himself did so passionately he forbade to the soldiers: they were not allowed to play for money or, at least, must never be caught doing so.'[7]

Captain Fritz ——, a fellow Mecklenburger, who had been at Auerstädt, with the King's German Legion in the Peninsula, and had the Cross of St George and the scar of a lance wound as souvenirs of Borodino, was well received when he called on Blücher early in 1813.

'When I called on our old hussar general, he was cheerful as always and displayed that rare joviality with which he always knew how to win

the hearts of those around him. He was just having a good breakfast of bread and ham and a few bottles of Hungarian wine, to which he had invited several Russian generals under his command, when I was permitted to enter.

'"It is indeed a great pleasure, Captain, to see you again. How the deuce did you acquire that memento on your cheek?" He talked in this friendly manner and shook my hand vigorously. "Take your things off and drink a glass of wine with us and tell us what you have been doing in the world since I last saw you. You are said to have got around quite a bit", he went on, giving me a large glass of the Hungarian wine. "Drink up!" he urged. "This is good wine, such as we do not have the chance of tasting every day." He introduced me to the Russian generals as the grandson of an old comrade in arms and the son of an officer of his regiment who had been a dear friend of his. I had to sit down at table and tell them about Wellington and the English, and it was so cheerful and pleasant that the few hours which our breakfast took slipped by very quickly for me. The General was still the same man whom I had known before; rank, fame and years had not affected him in the slightest. He laughed, joked and also swore like any good hussar officer, and for everyone, high or low, general or corporal, he had a coarse joke, an apt jest, but also, if he thought necessary, a rebuke. This unaffected joviality, which nothing put off, was of inestimable value to the Army of Silesia and helped substantially to improve it and to fit it for great deeds.'

Despite his affability Blücher could be heavy-handed, as the Saxons were to find when they mutinied in 1815.

The most perceptive analysis of Blücher's character comes from General Karl von Müffling (1775–1851), the Hanoverian who was to play an important part as liaison officer with Wellington's Headquarters at Waterloo.

'Despite a sharp, penetrating intellect Blücher had received no systematic education; only in contact with other people, finding himself on good terms with everyone, acting firmly and with great tact, his inexhaustible cheerfulness and his modest, good-natured behaviour won him friends wherever he went. He never despised knowledge, nor did he overestimate it. He talked frankly about the neglect of his upbringing, but he also knew very well what he could achieve without this education. His imperturbability in dangerous situations, his tenacity in misfortune, and his courage which grew under difficulties were based on an awareness of his physical strength, which he had often used in hand-to-hand fighting during earlier campaigns. In this way he had gradually convinced himself that there was no military predicament from which one could not ultimately extricate oneself by fighting, man to man. He had no very high opinion of any officer who did not share this view.

'In his opinion courage produced a military reputation, and it seemed to him impossible that



Grenadier, Foot Guards, 1809. Blue uniform, red facings, dark grey breeches. From a drawing by I. Wolf, engraved by F. Jügel

Officer, Guard Fusilier Battalion, 1809. The uniform is blue with red facings and silver lace. From a print of the period drawn by I. Wolf and engraved by F. Jügel

a brave man could lose such a reputation. He was never troubled by the slightest apprehension that a retreat or a lost battle could take away his own reputation. Thus the wish to command large armies was quite alien to him: as a field-marshal he put himself at the head of a squadron as readily as at the head of an army.

'He trusted the officers of his staff only when he considered them enterprising; but once they had earned this trust he gave it unreservedly. He allowed them to put forward their plans for marches, positions and battles, he grasped everything quickly, and if he had given them his approval and signed the relevant orders he would accept no outside advice, and no expressions of alarm made the slightest impression on him. . . .'

We have now arrived at the dawn of the campaigns which made Blücher's reputation. From this time his history is that of his army. Suffice it to add that he was made a field-marshal after Leipzig and in July 1814 – despite his own opposition – Prince Blücher von Wahlstadt. 'Everything', he wrote, 'will depend on the sort of principality I am to receive in Silesia. Under no circumstances will I consent to add one more to the horde of sickly, hungry princes.'

GENERAL HANS DAVID LUDWIG YORCK VON WARTENBURG (1759–1830). Yorck was commissioned in the Prussian Army at the age of 13, but got himself cashiered before he had had two years' service. He accused a brother officer of stealing while on campaign. This delicate case in military law was summarily dismissed by no less an authority than Frederick the Great, who wrote, 'Plundering is not stealing. Yorck can go to the devil' – a case history that soldiers would be unwise to take as a precedent.

Lieutenant Yorck was now compelled to seek his fortune abroad, and served in Ceylon with a French regiment in the pay of the Dutch East India Company. On Frederick's death he rejoined the Prussian Army, rising to command a Jäger regiment, and was noted as an expert trainer. With his customary 'awkwardness' he declined the coveted order *Pour le Mérite* saying that he wanted to win it on the field of battle and not on a parade ground.

In 1806 Yorck, badly wounded, was taken prisoner in Blücher's defence of Lübeck.

When Napoleon invaded Russia a Prussian contingent under Yorck served under Marshal Macdonald in his advance on Riga. He concluded the Convention of Tauroggen with the Russians (30 December 1812), and by so doing made the first move in the War of Liberation, in which the people of Germany threw off the yoke of Napoleon.

Beyond question Yorck was a difficult customer and, though competent and upright, a bad subordinate. He was known to the men as *der alte Isegrim*, which, though it means 'the old man with the iron helmet', is the centuries-old nickname given to the wolf in German folklore. He was merciless to looters, stragglers and camp-followers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ludwig von Reiche gives a balanced picture of this remarkable officer.

'Although General Yorck could often be bad-tempered and even harsh, he could also be just

as kind, and really charmed people in this way. He had a high degree of subtlety in his mind, and a tinge of slyness expressed itself in his spirited face especially when he was in a good humour and his peculiar sarcastic smile showed itself. Yet he had a tender heart susceptible to friendship.

'As a subordinate, however, Yorck was very disobedient and difficult to handle, which with a character like his is not to be wondered at.'

That Yorck was admired and could be quite charming is exemplified by an incident during the French retreat to the Rhine after Leipzig. Colonel Count Henckel von Donnersmarck, the commander of Yorck's advance guard, with two regiments of cavalry[8] rescued 200 Austrian officers and 4,000 men, taken at Dresden, who were being marched into captivity by two Polish battalions. When he reported to Yorck, the General took off his cap and said to his entourage, 'Gentlemen, let us give Count Henckel a cheer!'

'These words,' wrote the Count, 'spoken at this moment and by this man, I valued more than if I had been decorated with some order.'

Blücher, who had to put up with a good deal from 'the Wolf', said of him: 'Yorck is a waspish fellow; he does nothing but argue, but when he attacks, then he gets stuck in like nobody else.'

Not too bad an epitaph for *der alte Isegrim*.

GENERAL WILHELM BÜLOW VON DENNEWITZ (1755–1816). Colonel Hermann von Boyen (1771–1848), who was at one time his Chief of Staff, describes the General thus:

'Bülow had a very keen glance and an excellent memory; a bold self-confidence guided his steps, but this made him mostly an opponent of his superiors and a rather uncomfortable subordinate. Without being strictly trained as a scholar, the General had acquired a respectable fund of knowledge in many fields. He had a passionate love of music and had established a reputation as a composer. . . . The General had understood the events of the time in a liberal spirit; his views on war were mainly derived from the Seven Years War and our earlier military institutions [i.e. the legacy of Frederick the Great] and therefore he had been among the opponents of Scharnhorst even before the war. However, his practical understanding led him almost unconsciously to grasp the nature of this new war [of 1813]. Although very susceptible to fame, he placed very little value on outward distinctions, he was not self-seeking, and he esteemed people irrespective of their opinions.'[9]

In the Waterloo campaign the other three corps commanders were:

I. Lieutenant-General Hans Ernst Karl Graf von Zieten II (1770–1848). He had commanded a division in the Leipzig campaign.

II. Major-General George Dubislaw Ludwig Pirch I. He was 52 and came from Magdeburg.

III. Lieutenant-General Johann Adolf Freiherr von Thielemann. He was 50 and had led the Saxon cavalry fighting for Napoleon at Borodino in 1812.

It is well known that Wellington cared but little how his officers dressed when on campaign, and saw nothing objectionable in Sir Thomas Picton's taking his division into action top hat on head and umbrella in hand. It does not seem that Blücher's



Frederick Wilhelm Bülow von Dennewitz. From an engraving by T. Johnson

staff was much more 'dressy'. His own turn-out, with cloak and forage cap, was practical rather than showy. A great difference had crept in since the days of 1806 when Yorck had taken the field with his kit packed in a wagon and a light chaise. He took with him two extra uniforms, ten pairs of gloves, four pairs of trousers and waistcoats, an extra hat, cloaks, an abundance of personal clothing, four pairs of leather breeches, fifteen pairs of stockings, eight nightgowns, five nightcaps, three table-cloths, thirty-six napkins, a mattress, five pillows, a red silk bed-cover, two bedpans, a set of china and silver, cooking utensils, a coffee-grinder, eight razors, twelve glasses, and twenty-five bottles of liquor.[10]

On 5 October 1813 an incident took place which illustrates the new attitude towards turn-out and what is now vulgarly known as 'bull'. Boyen is once more our authority.

'While they were marching through Dessau there occurred another source of annoyance for the Crown Prince. Bülow took very little trouble over his dress, in glaring contrast to the Crown Prince, who devoted every possible care to this subject. We had no idea that the Crown Prince, who had never once bothered about the troops throughout the campaign or shown himself to them, was proposing to make an exception here. And so Bülow, wearing his service overcoat and a rather dilapidated field-cap, rode at the head of his troops on a small Polish horse. Suddenly we heard that the Crown Prince was waiting a few yards away in the streets of Dessau in order to let the corps parade past him. With the best will in the world there was no time to alter anything. Bülow drew his sword and, just as he was, led his troops past the Commander-in-Chief with all possible honours of war.

'However, this was a stab through the heart for the Crown Prince. He regarded it as a personal slight to the respect due to him, but instead of saying so direct he called me over and, in a voice which everyone round could hear, he mixed reproaches about this clothing offence with the old recital of all Bülow's real or alleged sins. As can well be imagined, I found myself in a most embarrassing situation, and when he reverted to the sartorial error I replied a trifle rudely that this had been the service dress in our army since the time of Frederick the Great, whereupon I was dismissed. In fact, part of my answer was a lie, because the Prussian officer has only our present monarch to thank for the dress specially made for campaigning.'[11]

The Crown Prince was, of course, Jean-Baptiste-Jules Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's marshals, who was now at the head of the Swedish Army.

GENERAL AUGUST GRAF NEITHARDT VON GNEISENAU (1760–1831). Born in Saxony, the son of a lieutenant in the artillery, Gneisenau joined the Austrian service, then, transferring to that of Anspach-Bayreuth, was sent to America in 1782 to fight for King George III against his rebellious colonists. Too late for the war, he returned to Europe, where in 1786 he joined the Prussian Army as a staff captain. In 1806 he commanded a battalion at Saalfeld and at Jena. In 1807 he greatly distinguished himself by his tenacious defence of the fortress of Kolberg, an exploit which won him the highest Prussian order, *Pour le Mérite*, and soon became legendary in German history – Hitler had a film made of it when the tide turned against him in the Second World War.

Gneisenau hated the Russians and mistrusted the English, but he got on splendidly with Blücher who needed someone to do his staff work. Friedrich von Schubert, an officer in the Austrian service, tells us that Gneisenau

'was a highly gifted and clever man of spirit and energy. He virtually commanded the Army of Silesia, yet he could not have done this in his own name. For one thing, he was not yet senior enough in rank; for another, public opinion demanded that Blücher's name, celebrated in Prussia, should be at the head. . . . Relations between Blücher and his Chief of Staff were most excellent. . . . Both men were fired by hatred of the French. But the one who could only conceive of "*Vorwärts*", had complete confidence in the outstanding abilities of the other, to whom he left all arrangements for the advance, and accepted personal responsibility for this.'

In 1814 the University of Oxford conferred on Blücher the honorary degree of doctor. At a dinner given in his honour the Field-Marshal said: 'Now, if you have made me a doctor, then

Gneisenau. From a medallion by L. Posch

Gneisenau must be made at least an apothecary.'

Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769–1860), a Professor of History and Philology, writes:

'Gneisenau was a man of fifty-two when I first saw him during the winter of 1812, but he looked like a thirty-year-old in bearing, walk and gestures. His figure was imposing, his limbs like those of a lion, and he had broad shoulders and chest. From the hips to the soles of his feet everything was strong, rounded and, wherever it should be delicate – the feet and joints – delicately and supply formed. He stood and moved like a born hero. A noble head crowned this powerfully built body of above average height: the brow was open, broad and serene, his dark hair grew thick, he had the most beautiful, large, blue eyes, which could look and flash with equal friendliness or disdain, a straight nose, full lips, a round chin, and an expression of manliness and beauty in all his features. The forehead bore a long, healed-up scar. "This scar", he used to say with a smile, "often makes me angry or bored, when people want to know in which battle I received the wound, and I have to send them away with the dusty answer: 'A foal was the hero who scarred the lad.'"

'This fine man had a passionate and fiery nature, and bold impulses and thoughts flowed incessantly to and fro within him. And if he did occasionally – a rare occurrence for him – fall into a half-dreamy, brooding state of exhaustion his face likewise radiated a bubbling, spiritual animation which seldom left his features in repose. Consequently, the very handsome face was difficult to take in and portray in its most peculiar, positive significance, and anyone who knew Gneisenau was dissatisfied with any portrait or engraving of him.'

Another intellectual, Henrik Steffens (1775–1845), who served on his staff, found Gneisenau 'a blend of noble pride and real humility, of confidence and modesty'. He discerned in Gneisenau a respect for higher intellectual training, but thought he lacked the agility of mind, the ready wit and the pungent irony which distinguished many of the outstanding senior officers of his day.[12] Gneisenau was a stern and unbending warrior, but not lacking in heart. On 19 October 1813 his A.D.C., Captain Stosch, rode with him across the corpses of the Silesian Landwehr on the battlefield of Möckern which Yorck had taken on the 16th: 'I watched Gneisenau's solemn face, and as he said to me, "Victory was bought with German blood at great cost, at very great cost", a tear trickled down from his eye. It was the only tear I ever saw him shed.[13] He was made a count for his services in the Leipzig campaign.

Gneisenau played a decisive part in the 1815 campaign and by his relentless pursuit of the *Armée du Nord* on the night after Waterloo showed himself as much a man of action as a staff officer. The pursuit he described as *die reine Klapperjagd*, a mad chase, and later declared that it was the most glorious night of his life. Gneisenau died of cholera in August 1831.

MAJOR-GENERAL KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ (1780–1831). Clausewitz was born at Magdeburg on 1 June 1780, and entered the Prussian Army as a *Fahnenjunker* (cadet) when he was 12. He served on the Rhine in 1793 and 1794 and after the siege of Mainz was commissioned.

From 1801 to 1803 he was a student at the Berlin Military School, then under the direction of General Scharnhorst, who was struck by his ability. Clausewitz for his part took Scharnhorst as his model. He passed out first with the General

Karl von Clausewitz

reporting on his breadth of vision, and obtaining him a posting as A.D.C. to Prince August of Prussia.

At the battle of Auerstädt Clausewitz led a battalion in the assault on Poppel.

Prince August's battalion was with Prince Hohenlohe's rearguard in the retreat that followed, and when surrender was imminent tried to fight its way out. After beating off several French cavalry attacks it was trapped in a bog and taken. Prince August and Clausewitz were prisoners of war until 1809.

On his return from France Clausewitz was appointed to Scharnhorst's staff and played a part in his reorganization of the Prussian Army. At this period he became a friend of Gneisenau. In 1810 Clausewitz became a member of the Prussian General Staff and a professor at the Military School, as well as military instructor to the Crown Prince of Prussia, later King Frederick William IV.

In 1812, when Napoleon took a Prussian corps to Russia, Clausewitz along with some 300 of his brother officers resigned their commissions and joined the Russian service, where he was A.D.C. to the Prussian General Ernst von Pfull (1779–1866). He was at Borodino and was with Miloradovich's rearguard covering the Russian withdrawal. In Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, Clausewitz served with General Wittgenstein's Corps. It fell to his lot to play a decisive part in the negotiations with Yorck that led to the Convention of Tauroggen.

In 1813 Clausewitz, still in the Russian service, was liaison officer at Blücher's headquarters, and in 1814 he was Chief of Staff to General Walmoden's Corps. In 1815 he re-entered the Prussian Army and served as Chief of Staff to General Thielemann (III Corps) at Ligny and Wavre.

In 1818 Clausewitz was promoted major-general and made Director of the Berlin Military School, an appointment which gave him time to devote himself to his writings. In 1830 he was transferred to the artillery at Breslau and in December of that year, when war with France appeared imminent, he was appointed Chief of Staff to Gneisenau. They were both victims of the cholera epidemic of 1831.

This is not the place to analyse Clausewitz's theories on the art of war. In addition to his great work, *On War* (3 vols.), he wrote studies of *The Italian Campaign, 1796–97*; *The Campaigns in Switzerland and Italy, 1799* (2 vols.), the campaigns of 1812, 1813 and 1814; and *The Waterloo Campaign*. Among a number of papers on the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Luxembourg, Frederick the Great and others, the most important was one on the debacle of 1806. This was published by the German General Staff in 1888.

The German *blitzkrieg* of 1939 and 1940 followed the classic German strategy hammered out by Blücher, but recorded, analysed and developed by Clausewitz, and handed down by the elder Moltke and by Schlieffen. Yet Clausewitz wrote not only for soldiers but for statesmen, and his legacy is to be found enshrined not only in Bismarck's policy of Blood and Iron, but in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.

GRAF AUGUST LUDWIG FERDINAND VON NOSTITZ (1777–1866). Blücher's A.D.C. was Graf August von Nostitz. The son of a Saxon cavalry general,

he had served in a dragoon regiment. As a captain he was with Blücher at Leipzig, and accompanied him to England in 1814. As a lieutenant-colonel he coolly rescued the old field-marshal when he was pinned under his dead horse at Ligny. Nostitz, aged 75 and by then a general of cavalry, carried Blücher's baton at Wellington's funeral in 1852. He kept a diary which has been published.

Nostitz showed his presence of mind not only at Ligny but at Leipzig, when (on 18 October) the Allies were entering the city and Blücher was leading up troops from a Russian corps with impatient cries of 'Vorwärts, vorwärts, Kinder!'

'A Russian general, of whose bravery Blücher had no great opinion, protested about the personal danger to which Blücher was exposing himself; but Blücher paid no attention, and renewed his shouts of "Vorwärts!" inspiring his troops to advance more rapidly still. At this moment my horse shied: it had been hit by a bullet. The Russian general, noticing this, drew Blücher's attention to the fact as a proof of his earlier assertion that Blücher was within range of bullets.

'Blücher turned peevishly round and asked, "Nostitz, is your horse wounded?"

'"I'm not aware of it", was my reply.

'At the gate the General remarked, "That was clever of you, Nostitz, telling a lie about your horse's wound. If you had said 'Yes', then our good friend would probably have gone to pieces."'[14]

STAFF

The Headquarters Staff under von Grölmann numbered only six officers. The remainder of the Army Staff numbered forty-nine and included the officer commanding the artillery, the commandant of Headquarters, surveyors, surgeons, an auditor, the provost-marshal and others. In all the Prussian Headquarters amounted to fifty-eight officers.

A corps staff comprised about twenty officers and a brigade staff about five.

The officers of the Army Headquarters included Lieutenant-Colonel Count von Nostitz, Blücher's A.D.C. who gallantly rescued his general at Ligny, Major von Winterfeldt, who was severely wounded when, while taking an important message to Wellington, he imprudently rode too near the French outposts; Captain von Wussow and Captain von Scharnhorst.

At Leipzig Yorck's staff included Colonel Katzeler, Major Count Brandenburg and Major von Schack. In the same battle Gneisenau's A.D.C. was Captain Stosch.

Cavalry

The three armies engaged in the 1815 campaign were led respectively by a gunner, an infantry officer and a cavalryman. Each showed a decided *penchant* for his old arm. Blücher was the cavalryman, and, despite his years and his heavy responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief, thought nothing of leading cavalry charges in person – a weakness which nearly brought complete disaster on at least one occasion.

In June 1808 the Prussian cavalry was 12,871 strong, including 535 officers and 1,766 N.C.O.s. Since the whole army only numbered 50,047 this was a reasonable proportion of mounted troops, but since 4,634 of the men were on more or less permanent leave,[15] the regiments can scarcely have been in a very high state of efficiency. When in 1813 the Prussian Army was expanded to some 200,000, serious difficulties were encountered. Of



Narrow escape of Blücher at Ligny. Trapped under his dead horse, he sees the 9th Cuirassiers charge past him. His A.D.C., Graf Nostitz, has dismounted to defend him. From a print by Wolf and von Maner

these the worst was the lack of horses. It actually proved impossible to mount all the veteran cavalry troopers available. Farm and draught horses which no self-respecting cavalry officer would have looked at in 1806 were pressed into the service – but it must be conceded that the French were in similar straits.

Despite every difficulty the Prussian cavalry held their own pretty well during the 1813–15 period, though it would be idle to pretend that their best units were as good as the *élite* regiments of Napoleon's cavalry. Nor were they anything like as well mounted or equipped as the British and King's German Legion cavalry of the day.

In the Waterloo campaign Blücher's cavalry numbered 11,948. This was not a particularly liberal provision.

	Cavalry	*Total*
Napoleon	20,000–22,000	125,000
Wellington	14,000	*c.* 110,000
Blücher	11,948	123,172

Moreover Blücher's cavalry was all allotted to his various corps. Unlike Napoleon he had no true reserve cavalry. The proportion of cavalry in each corps varied very considerably.

Corps	*Squadrons*	*Effectives*
I	32	2,175
II	36	4,471
III	24	1,981
IV	43	3,321

The Prussian cavalry which took part in the 1815 campaign comprised:

	Regiments	*Squadrons*
Hussars	9	33
Uhlans	8	—
Dragoons	5	19
Freiwillige Jäger Landwehr	12	—
Landwehr cavalry	15	—
Total	49	

At regimental and squadron level, cavalry tactics in Blücher's Army were much the same as in those of his contemporaries. Their tasks may be summed up as reconnaissance and outpost duty on campaign, and mounted action as might be appropriate during a pitched battle.

Friedrich Georg Ludwig von Sohr. Commanded a brigade at Ligny and rose to be *Generalleutnant*.

In two ways the Prussian cavalry differed from Napoleon's. It had not a large body of heavy cavalry equipped with the cuirass. This was perhaps no great deprivation, and indeed none of Wellington's heavy cavalry wore body armour. The other difference was fundamental. While Napoleon kept a mass of reserve cavalry which was not affiliated to any *corps d'armée*, all the Prussian cavalry was distributed to the various corps. It seems to the present writer that Napoleon's system, which permitted great strokes by a fully co-ordinated mounted arm upon the field of battle, was vastly superior. Although Ney's series of attacks recoiled from Wellington's squares at Waterloo, we have only to study other Napoleonic battles, Eylau for example, to see what the French reserve cavalry could do.

Blücher was an inspiring leader, but his best friend could not describe him as a clear-minded military thinker. It seems that he had not really thought out the best organization for his cavalry.

Nor did he have any great cavalry commander at his disposal. He lacked a Seydlitz to take a grip on the whole mass of his mounted arm. Men like Sohr and Henckel von Donnersmarck were first-class at the regimental level, but Blücher had nobody who could co-ordinate the movements of the cavalry as Uxbridge did for Wellington at Waterloo, and as Murat had done for Napoleon in the great days of the Empire.

The consequence of all this was that Blücher occasionally took it into his old hussar head to lead cavalry charges himself. Thus it was that at about 8 p.m. on 16 June 1815, when he could see by the setting sun nothing but ruin and a breach in his line filled with the bearskins of the Old Guard, he galloped forward at the head of Röder's five regiments. The Prussian cavalry, met by volleys at point-blank range, only succeeded in strewing the ground with the bodies of men and horses. Milhaud's Cuirassiers and the Dragoons of the Guard supported the French squares and they pressed on towards the windmill of Brye.

Undaunted, Blücher led his last remaining squadrons in a desperate charge. His horse was hit, and galloped wildly on, until suddenly it fell dead, crushing its aged master. Graf Nostitz dismounted to protect the Field-Marshal as the 9th Cuirassiers ebbed and flowed past them in the dim light, little knowing the prize that lay within their grasp. It fell to some Prussian uhlans to haul the old gentleman from under his dead horse, and to the charger of an N.C.O. of the 6th Uhlans to carry him back amidst the flood of departing Prussian soldiery.

While Blücher was playing the hussar, Count Gneisenau was working out the next move – and getting it right. So it may be said that if Blücher did not always behave precisely as a commander-in-chief should, at least he had managed to select a chief of staff who could carry on in his absence.

Infantry

When Prussia took the field against Napoleon in 1813 she was desperately short of trained man-power. This was largely due to the restrictions laid down by the Treaty of Paris of 8 September 1808.

Strength of the Prussian Army including reserves: 1807, 53,523; 1808, 52,142; 1809, 45,897; 1810, 62,609; 1811, 74,553; 1812, 65,000.[16]

It is true that under a programme attributed to Scharnhorst there had been an attempt to train reserves. The success of the *Krümper* system has become part of Prussian legend, but the assertion that 150,000 reservists were available in 1813 rests only on the mistaken idea that the new units formed that year consisted entirely of reservists. This was not so; they were built on a nucleus of trained officers, N.C.O.s and men, to which recruits were added.

That this was not easy is evident from the following figures:

Strength of the Prussian Army in June 1808:

	Infantry	*Artillery*	*Cavalry*	*Total*
Officers	1,079	147	535	1,761
N.C.O.s	3,264	503	1,766	5,533
Musicians	659	35	199	893
Surgeons	227	27	86	340
Troops	10,025	2,161	5,651	17,837
Men on leave	17,396	1,653	4,634	23,683
Total	32,650	4,526	12,871	50,047

We see that the Prussian Army, some 50,000 strong in 1808, comprised only 1,761 officers and 5,533 N.C.O.s.[15] There was a serious shortage of experienced officers and literate N.C.O.s. On the other hand there was a source of potential officers in the Volunteers (*Freiwillige Jäger*), who came forward in substantial numbers. They were, however, far from being imbued with the spirit of the old-style Prussian martinet. One of them, Count Christian Stolberg (1st East Prussian Regiment) wrote on 8 October: 'I am no soldier, but a fighter for the Fatherland; and when peace comes I shall return home. To be a soldier for its own sake will always be abhorrent to me.'[17]

Major Karl Friedrich Friccius (1779–1856), of the 3rd Battalion of the East Prussian Landwehr Regiment, tells us that in order to bring the unit up to strength they had to take many men under 17 or over 40.

'Even fathers of families, if the lottery had picked them, could seldom be exempted, and

Mounted officer, Foot Artillery of the Guard, 1809. Blue uniform with red piping around collar and cuffs. Red lining to jacket and stripe down overalls. Gold lace. From a contemporary print drawn by I. Wolf and engraved by F. Jügel

very often the town had to assume care of the wives and children. Where so many ways remained open of escaping from military service, and when the promised advantages appeared so meagre, and above all when it had not yet been settled whether privileges promised to volunteer *Jäger* should also be granted to *Landwehr* volunteers, voluntary enlistment in the *Landwehr* had greater merit than later on. In spite of all this, the Battalion had over one hundred such volunteers. Of the many boys who offered their services, we only took as many as we could use for drummers and buglers. All the rest were rejected. . . .

'As the men of the Battalion were drawn from a large town, they were better acquainted with the pleasures of life and perhaps weaker in physique, but they were also more experienced and skilful, and were imbued with greater claims to justice and honour. They were a strange mixture, drawn from the most varied walks of life and age groups. Beside a grey-haired man you might find a boy of seventeen; beside a worthy family-man, who had never conceived the idea of taking up arms while in the quiet circle of his civil profession, might be a gay adventurer; beside an educated young man, who had broken away from the happiest circumstances so as to fight for the Fatherland with high ideas of duty and honour, stood a raw youth. The other battalions of the province were recruited from the villages and small towns, where one found a greater uniformity in age, better physique, more contentedness and respect for their superiors, but less experience and docility.'[18]

The equipment left much to be desired. When 20,000 Austrian muskets were issued to the Silesian Landwehr it was discovered that the manufacturers had failed to bore touch-holes! Many of the soldiers had linen wallets instead of knapsacks. On 30 October 1813 Ernst Janke, a young Prussian officer, wrote to his family: 'But no one in Berlin will believe just how ragged our army is. The men's clothing is rotting off their bodies. What will be the outcome of it all?'

Yorck, describing the state of his corps after Leipzig, tells us that of 106 guns he had in September only 42 remained serviceable. Despite picking up a number of French muskets many of his men were unarmed.

'The troops who had taken part in the Russian campaign in Courland were still wearing the clothing issued to them in 1811. The Silesian *Landwehr*'s patrol jackets made out of coarse cloth had shrunk so badly as a result of wet bivouacs and rainy weather that they were too narrow fore and aft, and too short on top and below. We were approaching a winter campaign and the men still had no cloth trousers. The adage about ten patches for one hole found widespread application on the tight-fitting coats.

'There was a great lack of shoes, although on the march from Leipzig any new or worn footwear to be found had been requisitioned. Many, and not only *Landwehr* men but also *Jäger* volunteers, marched barefoot. There was a shortage of cloaks too, but here and there people had taken them off prisoners. The horses for the

artillery were worked very hard and many of them became unusable. What is more, the region we had marched through since leaving Halle was very poor in horses, so we had been able to requisition only a few.'[19]

The spirit of the Landwehr sustained them even when they had to march without shoes. But the shortage of food, lack of straw and firewood, and generally indifferent administration took its toll. In the eighteen days ending 1 September 1813 Yorck's Corps dwindled from 37,700 to 25,300, the losses among the Landwehr far exceeding those of the line regiments.[20]

Number of Regular and Landwehr infantry regiments in each corps:

	1815				
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*Total*
Regular	8	8	6[21]	4	26
Landwehr	4	4	6	8	22
Total	12	12	12	12	48

By way of making life more difficult for the military historian every Prussian regiment had two numbers. This was because they had a provincial as well as an army number. Thus the 21st was also the 4th Pomeranian Regiment, the 5th was also the 4th East Prussian; and so on.

The regiments were of three battalions, each of four companies. The first and second battalions were musketeers, the third was a fusilier battalion. The strength of a regiment was approximately 60 officers, 2,460 men and 54 musicians.

The infantry of the Prussian Army of 1806 fought in much the same style as the British Army of the same date – that is to say *before* the Peninsular War and the tactical improvements introduced by Sir John Moore and the Duke of Wellington. Both fought with their battalions in line, and met the French *tirailleurs* with a rather meagre proportion of light infantry. Nor is it strange that the two armies employed the same tactics since General Sir David Dundas (1735–1820), upon whose *Principles of Military Movements, chiefly applicable to Infantry* (1788) most British infantry training was still based, had borrowed his ideas from the Prussian Army.

Blücher's men manœuvred in much the same style as their French opponents, since with raw troops it was, generally speaking, much simpler to manœuvre battalions and regiments in column. The men were not sufficiently well drilled to fight in line as Frederick's had done and Wellington's still did. The British relied primarily on fire-power; on controlled volleys. The Prussians, at this period, believed in hand-to-hand fighting. Blücher, who, as we have seen, had no very high opinion of an officer who did not think that fighting man to man would solve practically any military problem, had managed to imbue his army with the same spirit. An incident at Möckern (16 October 1813) illustrates the point. Major von Hiller of Yorck's Corps was already under fire 'when old Blücher came galloping up and, pointing at random, shouted to me, "There is the point you must hold!" I received no further orders from anyone and led my battalion straight away into the blue or rather into the bullets, because we were met with a dense hail of fire from Möckern.' It was the custom in the Prussian Army for battalion commanders to take part in a bayonet attack on horseback, thus giving target practice for enemy marksmen. This von Hiller thought folly, but he did it just the same. He was soon hit, but he remounted and led his battalion successfully into Möckern. 'The battle swayed to and fro, we were driven out and then fought our way in again, four or even five times.' This was the sort of fighting that took place when on 18 June 1815 Bülow's Corps stormed Plancenoit. The attack was made by the 15th Regiment of Prussian infantry (16th Brigade) under Major von Keller, supported by some battalions of Silesian Landwehr. They were opposed by the Guard and it was a desperate struggle with little quarter given.[22]

If the Prussians lacked the iron discipline of Wellington's Army we must remember that the majority of the rank and file were far less experienced. It is true that at Waterloo many of Wellington's troops saw action for the first time. But even in the battalions that had not been in the Peninsula the majority of the men had had five years' service. In consequence they were thoroughly well drilled. This is not to say that the Prussians could not put on an impressive performance upon occasion. Take for example the



advance of Bülow's Corps at Leipzig (18 October 1813), as described by Lieutenant Kretzschmer.

'. . . A low line of hills in front of us hid the enemy from our view and also concealed our approach. Beyond the ridge light artillery and cavalry were sparring with the French and covering our advance. Cannon thundered on all sides and indicated that our countrymen and allies must already be engaged in fierce fighting. . . . On our side of the ridge Bülow's corps formed up, with Krafft's brigade on the right, Borstell's in the centre, and the Prince of Hesse-Homburg on our left.

'When everything was ready in battle order as on a parade ground, the first word of command was heard: "Brigade – march!" Like an echo came the commands: "Regiment – march! Battalion – march!" The columns advanced uphill as if parading past the King.

'At this moment the sun broke through the dark clouds as if to light our path to victory and to witness our battle; bayonets glinted in the sunshine and spirits rose. The Kolberg *Jäger* and those from the Crown Prince's Regiment began singing the folksong *Heil dir im Siegerkrantz!* with enthusiasm, and all the regimental bands joined in. As we gaily climbed the hill the hymn sounded from a thousand throats.'[23]

Blücher's infantry may have been inexperienced and poorly administered but they were more than a match for the conscripts Napoleon conjured up to replace the Army which had died in Russia.

1 **Feldjäger, 1809**
2 **Prince Blücher (Feldmarschall), 1813**
3 **General on the Staff, 1813**

1 **Officer, 4th Silesian Regiment, 1813–15**
2 **Officer, Silesian National Cavalry (Hussar) Regiment, 1813–15**
3 **Trumpeter, Saxon Hussars, 1814**

MICHAEL ROFFE

1 **Trumpeter, 6th (Neumark) Dragoons, 1813**
2 **Officer, 1st (Königin) Dragoons, 1813–15**
3 **Dragoon, 5th Brandenburg Regiment, 1814**

1 Trooper, 4th Squadron, 7th Saxon Regiment 1813–15
2 Officer, 1st Squadron, 7th Regiment, 1813–15
3 Adjutant of Cavalry, 1813–15

1 Drummer, 24th (4th Brandenburg) Regiment, 1811–15
2 Officer of Fusiliers, 22nd (1st Rhine) Regiment, 1811–15
3 Officer of the regimental staff, 1st Elbe Regiment, 1814

1 Officer, 3rd Silesian Regiment, 1811–15
2 Trooper, 2nd Neumark Regiment, 1813–15
3 Trumpeter, 1st Pomeranian Regiment, 1814

1 Officer, 1st Pomeranian Regiment, 1813
2 Private, 1st Westphalian Regiment, 1813
3 Drummer, 3rd Elbe Regiment, 1814–15

MICHAEL ROFFE

1 Cannoneer, Silesian Brigade, 1813–15
2 Trumpeter, Lützow's Corps, Battery No. 14, 1815
3 Officer, Brandenburg Brigade, 1815

MICHAEL ROFFE

Artillery and Pioneers

The artillery was commanded by General von Holtzendorff, who was hit at Ligny. He was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel von Röhl.

There were between thirty-eight and forty-one batteries. The foot and horse artillery batteries each had six guns and two howitzers. The siege batteries each had eight howitzers.

There were approximately one hundred and seventy-four 6-pounders, fifty-four 12-pounders and ninety-two howitzers, making a total of three hundred and twenty artillery pieces in all.

According to F. Bourdier there were only thirty-eight batteries:

Corps	*Batteries*	*Guns*	*Men (including 492 pioneers)*
I	11	88	1,258
II	10	80	1,575
III	6	48	1,062
IV	11	88	1,458
Total	38	304	5,353

It is perhaps prudent to rely on these figures, which were based on those of the great Belgian scholar, Winand Aerts, rather than the higher ones given by Major Becke.

To serve this formidable number of pieces there were only 4,861 artillerymen, and they had to be reinforced by infantrymen.

The Prussian artillery fired 4,800 rounds at Waterloo.

A PRUSSIAN BATTERY IN 1815

Captain von Reuter commanded Battery No. 6 which was armed with six 12-pounders and two howitzers.

On 25 May 1815 the battery was ordered to join Zieten's Corps (I) and move to Soirlen near Charleroi, where it lived a quiet country life, until on 15 June the rumbling of distant guns fell on von Reuter's ears as he was at breakfast, sipping his coffee, in the Château de Soirlen. By 2 p.m. the battery was on the march and towards evening it was in position on the far side of the village of Fleurus and on the left of the road. There it spent a most uncomfortable night. 'When day broke . . . the general was horrified to find that my battery was alone, without any escort, right under the noses of the enemy's advanced piquets. During the night the rest of the troops had all received orders to retire; but I and my guns had been completely overlooked! We would have fared badly indeed had the enemy made any attempt upon us under the cover of darkness.'

Von Reuter was ordered to fall back and take up a position near the windmill at Ligny. There about midday, while Wellington and Blücher were in conference on a near-by eminence, General von Holtzendorff, the commander of the Prussian artillery, rode up, and ordered No. 1 gun to fire a round. This, they were told, was the signal that Blücher had decided to accept battle.

Between 2 and 3 p.m. von Reuter was ordered to take four of his guns and support the 14th Regiment (7th Brigade, II Corps) in its advance on St Amand. The other two guns and the two howitzers 'took up a position opposite Ligny, so as to be able to shell the open ground beyond the village, and the village itself, too, in the event of our not being able to hold it'. Von Reuter went into action about 600 paces from St Amand, engaging French artillery in position on the high ground opposite. The enemy returned 'a well-sustained fire of shells' inflicting heavy casualties. The 14th Regiment, 'without ever thinking of leaving an escort behind for us', pressed gallantly forward and seized part of the village, indeed the captain thought they had occupied the whole of it. He had been in action for some hours and was expecting orders to follow up the movement of the 14th Regiment, when he became aware of two strong lines of skirmishers which were apparently falling back on the battery from the direction of St Amand. Reuter imagined they were Prussians and 'hastened up to the battery and warned my layers not to direct their aim upon them, but to continue to engage the guns opposite'. The skirmishers were now within 300 paces.

'I had just returned to the right flank of my command, when our surgeon, Zinkernagel, called my attention to the red tufts on the shakos of the sharpshooters. I at once bellowed out the order, "With grape on the skirmishers!" At the same moment both their lines turned upon us,

Prussian dragoons capture a Russian colour in combat at Eckau.
From a watercolour by Richard Knötel

gave us a volley, and then flung themselves on the ground. By this volley, and the bursting of a shell or two, every horse, except one wheeler, belonging to the gun on my left flank, was either killed or wounded. I ordered the horses to be taken out of one of my ammunition waggons, which had been emptied, and thus intended to make my gun fit to move again, while I meanwhile kept up a slow fire of grape, that had the effect of keeping the marksmen in my front glued to the ground. But in another moment, all of a sudden, I saw my left flank taken in rear, from the direction of the Ligny brook, by a French staff officer and about fifty horsemen. As these rushed upon us the officer shouted to me in German, "Surrender, gunners, for you are all prisoners!" With these words he charged down with his men on the flank gun on my left, and dealt a vicious cut at my wheel driver, Borchardt (a good artillery name, this), who dodged it, however, by flinging himself over on his dead horse. The blow was delivered with such good will that the sabre cut deep into the saddle, and stuck there fast. Gunner Sieberg, however, availing himself of the chance the momentary delay afforded, snatched up the handspike of one of the 12-pounders and with the words, "I'll soon show him how to take prisoners!" dealt the officer such a blow on his bearskin that he rolled with a broken skull from the back of his grey charger, which galloped away into the line of skirmishers in our front. The fifty horsemen, unable to control their horses which bounded after their companion, followed his lead in a moment, rode over the prostrate marksmen, and carried the utmost confusion into the enemy's ranks. I seized the opportunity to limber up all my guns except the unfortunate one on my left, and to retire on two of our cavalry regiments, which I saw drawn up about 600 paces to my rear. It was only when I had thus fallen back that the enemy's skirmishers ventured to approach my remaining gun. I could see from a distance how bravely its detachment defended themselves and it with handspikes and their side-arms, and some of them in the end succeeded in regaining the battery. The moment I got near our cavalry I rode up to them and entreated them to endeavour to recapture my gun again from the enemy, but they refused to comply with my request. I, therefore, returned sorrowfully to my battery, which had retired meanwhile behind the hill with the windmill on it near Ligny. We there replenished our ammunition waggons and limber boxes, and set to rights our guns, and the battery again advanced to come into action on the height. We had, however, hardly reached the crest of the hill when the

enemy issued from the village of Ligny in overpowering numbers, and compelled all our troops which were there with us to fall back. The movement was carried out with complete steadiness and regularity. It was now about eight o'clock p.m., and the growing darkness was increased by the heavy storm clouds which began to settle down all round us. My battery, in order to avoid capture, had, of course, to conform to this general movement. I now noticed that there was an excellent artillery position about 1,500 paces behind the village of Brye, close to where the Roman road intersects the road to Quatre Bras. I made for this point with all haste, so that I might there place my guns and cover with their fire the retreat of my comrades of the other arms. A hollow road leading to Sombreffe delayed my progress some minutes. At length I got over this obstacle and attained my goal; but just as I was going to give the word, "Action rear," Von Pirch's (II) infantry brigade (2nd I Corps) began to debouch from Brye. The general saw in an instant what he took for a selfish and cowardly movement of retreat on my part, dashed his spurs into his horse, and galloped up to me nearly beside himself with passion, and shouting out, "My God! Everything is going to the devil!" "Truly, sir," said I, "matters are not looking very rosy, but the 12-pounder battery, No. 6, has simply come here to get into a position from whence it thinks it may be able to check the enemy's advance." "That, then, is very brave conduct on your part," answered the general, at once mollified; "cling to the position at all hazards, it is of the greatest importance. I will collect a few troops to form an escort to your guns." While this short, but animated, discussion had been going on his brigade had come up close to where we were. He formed it up to cover us, and sent every one who was mounted to collect all retreating troops in the neighbourhood for the same purpose, while, as they came up, he called out to them, "Soldiers, there, stand your guns, are you not Prussians!"

'During the time that a sort of rear-guard was thus formed, the battery had opened fire on the enemy's cavalry, which was coming up rather cautiously, and had forced them to fall back again. Later on a 6-pounder field battery and half a horse artillery battery came up and joined us. The fight then became stationary, and as the darkness came on, fighting gradually ceased on both sides. During the course of the night this rear-guard, which, meanwhile, had come under the command of Major-General von Röder, continued its retreat unmolested by the enemy, crossed the Dyle on the 17th at Wavre, and there we again found our baggage. During the retreat I had the good fortune to be able to horse three guns of Meyer's battery [No. 4 (Pomeranian) II Corps] which I found on the road unable to get along, and drew them off with me. Yet Captain Meyer, annoyed at still having to leave three of his guns behind, was extremely rude to me because I could help him no further!'

During the withdrawal to Wavre (17 June) Blücher rode up and chatted with von Reuter. Hearing that he had lost a gun at Ligny, all the Prince said was: 'There, now! Don't let that worry you. We will very soon take it back from them again.'

The battery spent an unpleasant night on ground soggy from a heavy downpour which extinguished every attempt to make a bivouac fire. Towards morning the rain abated. The disabled guns were sent off to Maestricht to be repaired.

About midday the French (Grouchy's Corps) put in an appearance and while III Corps stayed to hold Wavre, the rest of the Prussian Army marched on Waterloo.

So bad was the road that it was not until evening that Battery No. 6 neared the battlefield. Von Reuter was ordered to push on with all haste, and mounted his detachments as best he could on the gun carriages. Even so he could not cover the next half-mile at a better pace than 'walk and trot'. The other troops made way for him. They were in high spirits, their bands playing. They greeted the guns with cheers and shouts of 'Hurrah! Here come our gallant 12-pounders!'

The moon was three days before full and rose well before sunset on the 18th.[24] Von Reuter timed his arrival on the battlefield saying, 'at this moment the moon rose'. The skies had rained themselves out and it was now as lovely a soft summer evening as ever the Captain saw, though with 'here and there a burning homestead'. As he

Left: Hermann von Boyen. A colonel in 1815, he rose to the rank of general. Right: Major von Lützow. From a sketch by Giuseppe Longhi

advanced he sensed that victory was won. He forced his charger, snorting with terror, across a hollow way filled with dead men and horses, and looked for a battery position, but the ground was thick with dead and wounded.

> 'The wounded, as we came rushing on, set up a dreadful crying, and holding up their hands entreated us, some in French and some in English, not to crush their already mangled bodies beneath our wheels. It was a terrible sight to see those faces with the mark of death upon them, rising from the ground and the arms outstretched towards us. Reluctant though I was, I felt compelled to halt, and then enjoined my men to advance with great care and circumspection. And soon I saw that I could in any case have no share in the glory of the day, for the enemy had begun to break and fly on all sides.'

He and Dr Zinkernagel spent the night trying to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded.

Captain Cavalié Mercer, who commanded G Troop, Royal Horse Artillery, at Waterloo, tells us that a Prussian battery encamped near him on the night of the battle, and that he prowled around, 'not altogether liking their appearance'. When he woke up on the 19th they had gone. He describes 'their brass guns kept bright, and their carriages encumbered with baggage'. It may well be that it was Battery No. 6 that had spent the night next to G Troop.

On 27 June near Compiègne, von Reuter's battery was in action for a short time against a small body of French troops. Zieten had given his gun detachments permission to carry their knapsacks on the gun carriages when on the line of march. When the skirmish was at its height the battery commander was suddenly startled when a hoarse voice behind him roared: 'But, Captain Reuter, I quite miss the old smartness I was accustomed to in this battery!' 'Imagine my consternation', wrote the captain, 'when I turned round and saw General Braun,[25] who had

formerly been my commanding officer, and on whom I now laid my eyes for the first time during this campaign.' He managed to convince the old martinet that Zieten had really given permission for this irregularity over the knapsacks – and his promotion to captain was confirmed.

Somewhere near Charleroi, Captain von Reuter found the gun lost at Ligny and with this incident, so pleasing to any good gunner, we will leave him. His narrative tells us more about the way Blücher's artillery went to work than all the tables of their calibres, the returns of their ammunition expenditure and casualties, and even the pictures of their uniforms.[26]

PIONEERS

Blücher's Army was not liberally provided with engineers and pioneers. In 1815 each of the four corps had one company of pioneers. They varied in strength from 63 with III Corps to 204 with I Corps.

Corps	*Pioneers*
I	204
II	74
III	63
IV	151
Total	492

A Miscellany

THE WOUNDED

The lot of wounded men and animals at the time of the Napoleonic Wars was extremely hard. The weapons of the period were capable of inflicting the most hideous wounds, and the medical services were not remarkable for their efficiency. Men like the celebrated Frenchman, Baron Larrey,[27] were few and far between. It was not only that there were too few surgeons. There was also a chronic shortage of ambulances, stretcher-bearers, nurses, hospitals and even such simple necessities as dressings. As for anaesthetics they were virtually unknown.

Blücher's officers and men stood up to the singularly unpleasant conditions of service pretty well. Their stoicism in the face of wounds and death was pretty creditable. Major von Hiller leading his battalion into a hail of fire at Möckern was hit in the hand.

'The surgeon wanted to take me out from under fire in order to bandage it properly. "We've no time for that", I told him. "Just patch it up for the time being." And while he was doing so the poor devil was hit in the head and fell dead on the spot. So, still unbandaged, I remounted and led my battalion successfully into Möckern.'[28]

The damage that a single shell could do to the close-order formations of those days is horribly illustrated by an incident earlier the same day. Wenzel Krimer, the senior surgeon of a battalion in Jägow's Brigade, was talking to a captain named von Pogwisch 'when a shell came over from ahead of us, exploded instantly, smashed an officer and a sergeant in the chest and head, and broke the legs of twelve men in the column'. Krimer himself had a narrow escape for a fragment went between his legs. He continues:

'My company surgeons had run away. I had plenty to do and ought to have carried out twelve amputations straight away, but I had to confine myself to preventing the wounded men bleeding to death and then having them carried to the rear. I was still hard at work when a second shell came over, carried off the whole of the upper part of the adjutant's body and decapitated

General Scharnhorst, mortally wounded at Grossgörschen (2 May 1813), is carried from the field. From a painting by Röchling in the Museum at Lützen

***Litewka* and sabre of an East Prussian Volunteer National cavalryman, 1813**

three men. Then it rolled as far as the Silesian rifle-battalion drawn up behind us and caused considerable casualties there.'[29]

Most of the wounds were severe. On the same day Lieutenant Woyski was wounded in the ankle. 'I showed my wound to the captain and then went off to find a carriage and get the wound properly dressed, although I had done this myself as best I could on first being hit.' He limped back amidst cries of pain from the numerous wounded of both sides lying in a cabbage-field. 'In several places I actually saw blood running between the cabbage stalks.'

As he went back he was hit by a ricochet in the shoulder, and a third time on the inside of his thigh. One of his company, who had been wounded in the hand, helped him along, for his foot was becoming increasingly useless.

'We had gone only a few yards like this, side by side, when I suddenly heard a dull thud beside me. I fell to the ground, felt myself spattered with blood, and saw beside me a leg. Then I heard the soldier calling, 'Friend, kill me, please! Kill me!' One of the many cannon-balls which were still rolling had struck him from behind and torn off his leg just below the belly. I had to leave him in this fearful condition, lying in the ditch with only a few minutes to live.'[30]

Another Leipzig casualty (16 October) was Ludwig von Gerlach (1795–1877), an officer of the 1st East Prussian Regiment, who was shot in the thigh, fell to the ground and could not get up. His leg felt dead and was pouring blood. Two soldiers of the Silesian Landwehr dragged him to the road, where he lay in the ditch until about dusk. He was lifted on to a captured French gun,

'but could not endure for long the pain of being jolted about, and so was soon carried into the deserted village of Wahren. Here, in a farm-house filled only with wounded men, I was attended by a company surgeon who was very pleased to see me, because he had become separated from his unit and hoped that as an officer I would vouch for the fact that he had been bandaging wounds here. He extracted the ball by means of a cross-cut in my thigh and then lightly dressed the wound.'

He spent the night on the floor, lying on some straw beside a delirious hussar. Next day

'a peasant arrived with a wheelbarrow and some straw and carted me off to Schkeuditz, where I spent the night in the town hall on a palliasse, alongside an officer who was dying from a head wound. On the following day, 18 October, I was taken to Halle.'[31]

The aged Feldmarschall-Vorwärts was every bit as tough as his men. He had two horses shot under him at Ligny, and the second fell on top of him. Yet next day, sustained, they say, by schnapps, he was riding about and cheerfully encouraging officers and men. On the morning of 18 June the physician, Bietzke, suggested rubbing ointment into the bruises he had sustained; all he said was that it was a matter of indifference to

him whether he went into Eternity 'balsamirt' or 'nicht balsamirt'. 'But', he added, 'if all goes well today, we shall soon all be washing and bathing in Paris.'

MUSIC

At the end of the day many of the survivors of Yorck's Corps, who had lost heavily in the capture of Möckern, sang *Nun danket alle Gott* – not unnaturally. Like Frederick's soldiers after Leuthen they were elated by victory and grateful for survival.

On 18 October the Kolberg *Jäger* and those of the Crown Prince's Regiment began singing *Heil dir im Siegerkrantz!* with enthusiasm as Bülow's Corps went into action at the battle of Leipzig, and the regimental bands joined in. This was composed by Heinrich Harries (1762–1802), a Schleswig pastor, in 1790 and published in 1793. It was sung to the same tune as *God save the King*. The Prussians struck up this song again when Blücher met Wellington at La Belle Alliance in the dusk of 18 June 1815. It was still popular in the Prussian Army of 1870.

HONOURS AND AWARDS

At the end of the 1814 campaign the King of Prussia rewarded a number of his generals.

Blücher, promoted field-marshal after Leipzig, was made a prince; Yorck was created Count Yorck von Wartenberg; Kleist, Count Kleist of Nollendorf; Bülow, Count Bülow of Dennewitz; Tauenzien, Tauenzien of Wittenberg; and Gneisenau was also made a count. It was a special distinction that several of these generals were given titles which recorded great feats of arms.

The highest Prussian award, instituted by Frederick the Great, remained the order *Pour le Mérite*; but for the rank and file the Iron Cross was instituted on 10 March 1813.

French observers noted during the occupation of Paris that of all the Allied troops only the British were not liberally bedizened with medals. Still like Ludwig von Gerlach who was three times wounded, subalterns certainly worked for their Iron Crosses in Blücher's Army. Another youthful hero was Lieutenant Karl Friedrich von Steinmetz (1796–1877), nephew of the man who commanded the 1st Brigade (I Corps) in 1815, who won the Iron Cross (2nd Class) at Laon on 29 April 1814, when, though wounded, he remained at his post. He had lost a brother near Grossgörschen (2 May 1813) and another severely wounded in the bloody fight for Möckern. Steinmetz lived to be a *Generalfeldmarschall* and to command the First Army in 1870.

At Bautzen an artillery veteran had the presence of mind to extinguish the fuse of a French shell which landed within ten yards of the spot where the Tsar was conversing with the King of Prussia. The latter called out to him asking his name and length of service. 'You shall be rewarded, my brave fellow. Here on the spot I promote you to be an officer.' The gunner humbly thanked the King, but declined to accept his gracious mark of favour, saying that he would have been a corporal years ago had he not been unlettered. However,

The Kolberg Infantry Reigment, 1811. Blue uniform with red facings and yellow metal buttons. From left to right: grenadier; musketeer; fusilier. (R. Knötel)







(a) The Iron Cross; (b) Cross of the 2nd Class, distributed for the first time to Pomeranian soldiers who were heroes of the action at Lüneburg in 1813; (c) Cross of the 1st Class made of black silk ribbon, bordered with white; (d) Grand Cross, commonly known as Blücher's Star

he had the sense to add: 'Your Majesty, however, will not, I hope, be displeased, if I mention that *the pay* of an officer would make my family and myself happy for life.' The King not only took the hint, but gave him an Iron Cross into the bargain, whilst the Tsar bestowed upon him the coveted Order of St George.

Promotion was the reward of good service. Count Henckel von Donnersmarck, a colonel in 1813, was a major-general commanding a brigade in 1815. Colonel von Hiller, who led the 16th Brigade at Waterloo, had been wounded as a major, while gallantly leading his battalion at Möckern. Lieutenant-Colonel von Sohr who commanded a cavalry brigade (II Corps) in 1815, was wounded in the right arm as a major while commanding the Brandenburg Hussars at Leipzig (16 October 1813). He had earned his promotion, for at the end of the battle old Yorck had said to him: 'To you alone I owe today's victory, and I shall never forget you and your gallant regiment.'

Blücher's A.D.C., Graf August von Nostitz, a captain in 1813, was already a lieutenant-colonel *before* Ligny, where he displayed such splendid gallantry. Certainly Blücher's was an army in which a bold leader fared at least as well as a clever staff officer.

PRUSSIAN ORDER OF BATTLE, 15 JUNE 1815

It is not easy to arrive at a correct description of Blücher's Army as it was on the eve of Waterloo. On the whole Bourdier's list seems the best. It is based on the researches of Winand Aerts, a Belgian scholar who devoted years of his life to the study of every aspect of the Waterloo campaign. But Bourdier seems to give many of the officers named too high a rank. In this respect – but only this – Müffling's list seems preferable, though it is not without palpable inaccuracies. Becke does not go into as much detail as Bourdier or Müffling and seems to give Blücher rather more guns than he actually had. In compiling the list that follows I have tried to steer a course between all these various hazards.

STAFF

Commander-in-Chief:
Field-Marshal Prince Blücher of Wahlstadt.
Quartermaster-General and Chief of Staff:
Lieutenant-General Count von Gneisenau (1760–1831)
Chief of the General Staff:
Major-General Karl Wilhelm Georg von Grölmann (1777–1843)
Representative at Wellington's Headquarters:
Major-General Baron von Müffling
Artillery:
General von Holtzendorff (casualty), 16 June
Colonel von Röhl.

I CORPS

G.O.C.:
Lieutenant-General Hans Ernst Karl Graf von Zieten II (1770–1848)
C.O.S.;
Lieutenant-Colonel Ludwig von Reiche

INFANTRY

1st Brigade. Major-General Karl Friedrich Franciscus von Steinmetz[32] (1768–1837)
12th Regiment (2nd Brandenburg)
24th Regiment
1st Regiment (Westphalian Landwehr)
3rd and 4th Companies (Silesian Rifles)
2nd Brigade. Major-General Otto Karl Lorenz von Pirch II
6th Regiment (1st West Prussian)
28th Regiment
2nd Regiment (Westphalian Landwehr)
3rd Brigade. Major-General von Jägow
7th Regiment (2nd West Prussian)
29th Regiment
3rd Regiment (Westphalian Landwehr)
1st and 2nd Companies (Silesian Rifles)
4th Brigade. Major-General Count Henckel von Donnersmarck
19th Regiment
4th Regiment (Westphalian Landwehr)

CAVALRY

Major-General von Röder
1st Brigade. Major-General von Treskow II
Dragoon Regiment, No. 5 (Brandenburg)
Dragoon Regiment, No. 2 (1st West Prussian)
Uhlan Regiment, No. 3 (Brandenburg)
2nd Brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel Ludwig Adolf Wilhelm, Freiherr von Lützow (1782–1834)
1st Kurmark Landwehr
2nd Kurmark Landwehr
Uhlan Regiment, No. 6

Hussar Regiment No. 4 (Silesian). Attached to 1st Infantry Brigade
1st Landwehr (Westphalian). Attached to 2nd Infantry Brigade

ARTILLERY

Colonel von Lehmann
12-pounder batteries, Nos. 2, 6 and 9
6-pounder batteries, Nos. 1, 3, 6, 8, 15 and 21

The 1st and 2nd Silesian Infantry Regiments. Blue uniforms with yellow collars and cuffs. The fusiliers had white epaulette-straps, and the musketeers red. Grey greatcoats, forage caps and jackets are worn. (R. Knötel)

Howitzer battery, No. 1
Horse Artillery battery, No. 10

INFANTRY	29,135
CAVALRY	2,175
ARTILLERY AND PIONEERS	1,258
Total	32,568

II CORPS

G.O.C.:
Major-General Georg Dubislaw Ludwig von Pirch I
C.O.S.:
Colonel Aster

INFANTRY

5th Brigade. Major-General Graf von Tippelskirch
2nd Regiment (1st Pomeranian)
25th Regiment
5th Regiment (Westphalian Landwehr)



Volunteer Jäger Squadron of the Brandenburg Cuirassier Regiment. Green uniforms, gold lace. The Jäger in the *litewka* (right) has a red collar. The other two figures have cornflower-blue collars and cuffs. The centre figure depicts Baron de la Motte Fouqué (1777–1843), who had served as a cuirassier officer, but after the Rhine campaign had resigned on the grounds of ill-health (1803). He rejoined in 1813 and fought valiantly at Grossgörschen, where his horse was killed, bringing him down in a French square. In November 1813, being seriously ill, he was granted an honourable discharge with the rank of major. (R. Knötel)

6th Brigade. Major-General von Krafft
Infantry Regiment Kolberg, No. 9
26th Regiment
1st Regiment (Elbe Landwehr)
7th Brigade. Major-General von Brause
14th Regiment
22nd Regiment
2nd Regiment (Elbe Landwehr)
8th Brigade. Major-General von Bose[33]
21st Regiment
23rd Regiment
3rd Regiment (Elbe Landwehr)

CAVALRY

Major-General von Wahlen-Jürgass, wounded Ligny
1st Brigade. Colonel von Thümen, killed Ligny
Colonel von Schmiedeberg
Dragoon Regiment, No. 6 (Neumark)
Königin Dragoner Regiment, No. 1
Uhlan Regiment, No. 2 (Silesian)
2nd Brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel von Sohr
Hussar Regiment, No. 5 (Pomerania)
Hussar Regiment, No. 3 (Brandenburg)
The 7th and 8th Brigades each had two squadrons of the Elbe Landwehr Cavalry attached to them.
3rd Brigade. Colonel Graf von der Schulenberg
Landwehr Regiment, No. 4 (Kurmark)
Landwehr Regiment, No. 5 (Kurmark)

ARTILLERY

Colonel von Röhl
12-pounder batteries, Nos. 4 and 8
6-pounder batteries, Nos. 5, 6, 10, 12, 34 and 37
Horse Artillery batteries, Nos. 5 and 14

INFANTRY	27,002
CAVALRY	4,471
ARTILLERY AND PIONEERS	1,575
Total	33,048

III CORPS

G.O.C.:
Lieutenant-General Johann Adolf Freiherr von Thielemann
C.O.S.:
Colonel Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831)
9th Brigade. Major-General von Borcke
30th Regiment
Leib Regiment, No. 8
1st Regiment (Kurmark Landwehr)
10th Brigade. Colonel von Kämpfen
27th Regiment
2nd Regiment (Kurmark Landwehr)



Prussian Infantry of the Line, 1811–15. Privates. The Prussian infantry depicted here belong to the 2nd Silesian Infantry Regiment. They wear uniforms of Prussian blue, with yellow collars and cuffs, a black shako with white-and-black Prussian pompom, and grey breeches with black gaiters. Figures from left to right are as follows: 1. Grenadier, as the brass eagle badge on his shako and the tall black plume to his shako show. The belts and straps of his equipment are white as they are on the next figure. 2. Musketeer. This is indicated by the fact that his shako has no plume and in place of the eagle bears the royal monogram of the King of Prussia in brass. 3. Fusilier. His shako is also without plume and instead of a badge it has a black-and-white cockade with a brass button in the centre and white braid running from the pompom to the cockade. The fusilier's cross-straps and pack-straps are all of black leather. 4. This shows the back view of a musketeer in campaign dress. The round plate on the black ammunition pouch is of brass and has the eagle of Prussia stamped upon it. This plate or badge was worn by all Prussian line troops on their pouches. As a concession to the rigours of campaign our figure is wearing a pair of loose white trousers sometimes adopted by the Prussians on service. (Drawings by Gerry Embleton, described by Marcus Hinton)

11th Brigade. Colonel von Luck[34]
3rd Regiment (Kurmark Landwehr)
4th Regiment (Kurmark Landwehr)
12th Brigade. Colonel von Stülpnagel
31st Regiment
5th Regiment (Kurmark Landwehr)
6th Regiment (Kurmark Landwehr)

CAVALRY

Major-General von Hobe
1st Brigade. Colonel von der Marwitz
Uhlan Regiment, No. 7
Uhlan Regiment, No. 8
2nd Brigade. Colonel Graf von Lottum
Dragoon Regiment, No. 7
Uhlan Regiment, No. 5
Hussar Regiment, No. 9

Each infantry brigade had attached to it two squadrons of the 3rd or the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry.

ARTILLERY

Colonel von Mohnhaupt (Müffling)
Major von Greventz (Bourdier)
6-pounder batteries, Nos. 7, 18, 20 and 35
Horse Artillery batteries, Nos. 18 and 19

Volunteer Jäger detachment of the 1st Silesian Hussar Regiment. Green with yellow facings and silver lace. The mounted officer's pelisse is lined with red, and the stripes down the overalls of both figures are red. (R. Knötel)

INFANTRY	22,275
CAVALRY	1,981
ARTILLERY AND PIONEERS	1,062
Total	25,318

IV CORPS

G.O.C.:
General Friedrich Wilhelm Count Bülow von Dennewitz (1755–1816)

13th Brigade. Lieutenant-General von Hacke
10th Regiment (1st Silesian)
2nd Regiment (Neumark Landwehr)
3rd Regiment (Neumark Landwehr)
14th Brigade. Major-General von Ryssel
11th Regiment (2nd Silesian)
1st Regiment (Pomeranian Landwehr)
2nd Regiment (Pomeranian Landwehr)
15th Brigade. Major-General von Losthin
18th Regiment
3rd Regiment (Silesian Landwehr)
4th Regiment (Silesian Landwehr)
16th Brigade. Colonel von Hiller
15th Regiment: O.C. Major von Keller
1st Regiment (Silesian Regiment)
2nd Regiment (Silesian Regiment)

CAVALRY

General Prince Wilhelm of Prussia
1st Brigade. Colonel Graf von Schwerin, killed 18 June
Hussar Regiment, No. 10
Hussar Regiment, No. 6 (2nd Silesian)
Hussar Regiment, No. 1 (West Prussian)
2nd Brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel von Watzdorff, killed 18 June
Hussar Regiment, No. 8
3rd Brigade. General von Sydow
Landwehr No. 1 (Neumark)
Landwehr No. 2 (Neumark)
Landwehr No. 1 (Pomerania)
Landwehr No. 2 (Pomerania)
Landwehr No. 1 (Silesia)
Two squadrons from the 2nd or 3rd Silesian Landwehr were attached to each brigade.

ARTILLERY[35]

Major von Bardeleben
12-pounder batteries, Nos. 3, 5 and 13
6-pounder batteries, Nos. 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 21
Horse Artillery battery, No. 11

INFANTRY	27,459
CAVALRY	3,321
ARTILLERY AND PIONEERS	1,458
Total	32,238

TOTAL

INFANTRY	136 Battalions	105,871
CAVALRY	135 Squadrons	11,948
ARTILLERY	38 Batteries 304 Guns	4,861
PIONEERS	4 Companies	492
	Total	123,172



A Prussian infantry colour

The Plates

THE STAFF

A1 Feldjäger

He wears a green uniform, cut like that of a dragoon, with yellow facings and brass buttons. He has grey overalls trimmed with red, and black leather accoutrements. He wears an oilskin cover to protect his shako. His sabre, which has a metal scabbard, is suspended from a waist-belt. The officers wore silver instead of yellow on their epaulette straps, and a silver sash as was usual in the Prussian service. In other respects there was little or no difference between the uniform or saddlery of officers and men. Schabracques, which were rather like those of the French hussars of the period, were trimmed with red.

The *Feldjäger* were a corps whose duties were similar to those of the Royal Staff Corps in the British service or the various troops of *Guides* in Napoleon's Army.

A2 Prince Blücher

Blücher's campaign dress, like Wellington's, was severely practical, designed for comfort rather than show. The picture on page 19 which shows him at Ligny with a galaxy of orders on his coat is romantic rather than accurate. The *Feldmarschall* wears an unstiffened cap, not unlike the caps which officers, both German and British, wore in the trenches in 1914 and 1915. Bernadotte would not have liked it (see p. 16)! Over a simple double-breasted jacket with scarlet facings and gold lace Blücher wears a regulation greatcoat with a cape, very similar to those worn by British general officers of the period. Like other Prussian officers the Prince wore a silver sash round his waist; his sabre, as normal with Prussian generals, was of the light cavalry type with a silver sword-knot and a yellow metal scabbard. His saddle-cloth was red, trimmed with gold.

A3 General on the Staff

This figure calls for no special comment except to say that Prince Blücher's coat, details of which are concealed by his greatcoat, is of the same cut. Like the *Feldjäger* the general wears an oilskin shako cover.

HUSSARS

At this period Prussian hussar uniforms had much of the variety that one finds in the *Grande Armée*. A notable exception is that one does not find the *kolpak*, or busby, as worn by the *compagnie d'élite* in French hussar regiments.

B1 Officer, 4th Silesian Regiment

In this regiment the dress of officers and men was very similar, though Bourdier's uniform plates show (plate 9) an N.C.O. without the pelisse. Other ranks had silver instead of gold lace on their yellow collars, and their sashes were yellow and silver, alternately, as opposed to the silver of the officers. The sabretache was red with white trimmings and the schabracque was trimmed with red (see figure *B3*). The saddlery was much the same as in the French service. A canteen was carried on the back of the saddle.

B2 Officer, Silesian National Cavalry (Hussar) Regiment, 1813–15

This well-decorated officer, who wears the Iron Cross among his medals, is based on one of Richard Knötel's plates (*Uniformenkunde*, Band XIV, No. 27), which in turn was based on an old gouache painting. In theory Silesian cavalry were supposed to have yellow collars and cuffs, but evidently stocks of yellow cloth were inadequate, and from the outset the 3rd and 4th Squadrons had red facings. Again, in theory, the buttons were supposed to be covered with red worsted. However, a sketch dated 19 June 1814, belonging to the Elberfeld Manuscript in the collection of Freiherr von Lipperheide, showed red collars and yellow metal buttons. It is as well to be reminded from time to time that regiments do not always conform to the Dress Regulations, especially in armies which are raised at short notice!

B3 Trumpeter, Saxon Hussars

In the Prussian service it seems that the trumpeters wore a uniform of the same colour as the rest of the regiment, their normal distinction being the special form of epaulette which one sees for example in the dragoon (figure *C3*).



Captain von Hellwig's Streifcorps. This unit was formed by a cavalry officer in 1813 as a sort of reconnaissance corps. Its uniforms came from England. The hussars had red uniforms with blue collars, cuffs and busby-bags; the officers had gold lace and the men white. Red stripes to the overalls and trimmings to the schabracque appeared, and collars and cuffs had white piping. The lance pennons were blue over red. Infantry uniforms were rifle green with black facings.

The unit served in the Low Countries in 1813 and 1814, and in 1815 was absorbed into the 27th Line Regiment and the 7th Lancers. (R. Knötel)

DRAGOONS

Sky-blue and green appear to have been the main colours of the Prussian dragoon uniforms. There were two quite distinctive styles of coat or jacket, the *litewka* (figure *C1*) and the *kollet* (see figures *C2* and *C3*).

C1 Trumpeter 6th (Neumark) Dragoons
This trumpeter is wearing the *litewka*.

C2 Officer, 1st (Königin) Dragoons
This officer is wearing the *kollet* style of jacket.

C3 Dragoon, 5th Brandenburg Regiment
One would expect dragoons to be armed with carbines as well as sabres, but this is a detail seldom shown in uniform plates. Bourdier shows (plate 12) one of the 1st Königin Dragoons, with a carbine slung over his right shoulder. The white buff belt over the left shoulder was, it seems, for the cartridge-box. The sabre was slung from the waist-belt.

This regiment had sky-blue cloth schabracques with a black edging. The portmanteau was grey and the canteen was slung at the back of the saddle on the left side. This was the normal arrangement among the dragoons, the schabracque and its trimmings following the colours of the coat and its facings.

UHLANS AND STAFF

Generally speaking the uniform of Prussian uhlans resembled that of the Polish Lancers in Napoleon's Army. For the most part officers and men wore the *czapska*, a short jacket and overalls. The *litewka*, though found in Lützow's Corps, was unusual. Instead of the *czapska* some regiments, which had formerly been hussars, retained their shakos.

D1 Trooper, 4th Squadron, 7th Saxon Regiment
The officer's uniform was very similar, except that he had silver epaulettes, and silver piping on his *czapska* and his belt.

D2 Officer, 1st Squadron, 7th Regiment (formerly Hellwig's Hussars)
A typical lancer uniform of the period, which calls for no special comment.

D3 Adjutant of Cavalry
This smart uniform, reminiscent of the Austrian rather than the Prussian Army, is that of a staff officer of the cavalry. The young gentleman must have felt somewhat conspicuous under fire!

LINE INFANTRY

The infantry of the line wore a shako, a short jacket – those of the officers had rather longer tails – breeches and gaiters. An occasional variation was white trousers. Prussian blue was the dominant colour, but the Silesian *Jäger* wore green as one would expect, and grey and even black are sometimes found. Breeches were usually grey, and boots or gaiters black. Silesian infantry wore a black shako with a white band round the

top, bearing the white-and-black Prussian pompom in front. The coat was dark Prussian blue and had a yellow collar and cuffs; the shoulder-straps and the turn-backs to the coat-tails were scarlet, and the cuff-slashes (the vertical strips of cloth on the cuff) were the same colour as the coat. The buttons on the front of the coat, on the shoulder-straps and the cuff-slashes were brass. Grey breeches were worn with black gaiters.

E1 Drummer, 24th (4th Brandenburg) Regiment
He wears a black oilskin cover over his shako, fastened with ties at the back; his greatcoat is rolled round his body in much the same fashion as with most other Prussian troops when on campaign, with a strip of brown leather to keep it tidy; he carries a white knapsack on his hip for rations, and he would also have a mess tin encased in a white canvas cover attached to the back of his pack by a leather strap. His sword is carried in a brown leather scabbard with a brass tip; his drum is suspended from a white leather belt bearing a brass plate with two sockets into which the drumsticks are thrust when not in use.

E2 Officer of Fusiliers, 22nd (1st Rhine) Regiment
The officer is in full marching order. His shako, covered with an oilskin, would have a band of gold braid round it with gilt eagles and a gilt chain. As decoration the black-and-silver cockade would have a gold-braided loop and button, above which is a silver pompom with black centre. The shoulder-straps to his coat are red trimmed with silver braid, and he carries a grey goatskin pack slung from white straps. The sword-scabbard is trimmed in gilt and the sword has a gilt hilt with a silver sword-knot. The waist sash is silver with two rows of black threads running through it.

E3 Officer of the regimental staff, 1st Elbe Regiment
This gentleman is exercising the 'Divine Right' of commanders to dispense with equipment: no pack, no blanket roll and comfortable overalls instead of tight boots.

LANDWEHR CAVALRY

Most of the Landwehr cavalry wore the *litewka* and were armed with the lance.

F1 Officer, 3rd Silesian Regiment
This smart officer looks like a regular cavalryman. The resemblance of the uniform to some of the Polish Lancers of the *Grande Armée de Varsovie* is remarkable. Bourdier shows a trooper of the same regiment with an oilskin cover over his *czapska* and with a yellow and red lance pennon. The schabracque was blue with yellow trimmings.

F2 Trooper, 2nd Neumark Regiment
His shako is that of the regular dragoons.

F3 Trumpeter, 1st Pomeranian Regiment
His shako looks much the same as those worn by British light infantry of the period.

LANDWEHR INFANTRY

The appearance of the Landwehr was, as might be expected, rather more casual than that of the line. The *litewka* seems to have been a popular garment; while both officers and men wore trousers instead of breeches and gaiters. Headgear varied from a cap, often with an oilskin cover, such as Blücher himself favoured, to a shako like that of the regulars. Some of the shakos (see figure *G1*) look as if they were of British origin.

G1 Officer, 1st Pomeranian Regiment

G2 Private, 1st Westphalian Regiment

G3 Drummer, 3rd Elbe Regiment

THE ARTILLERY

The uniforms of the Prussian artillery were by no means all of Prussian blue with grey trousers. Those of Lützow's Corps wore a black *litewka*; the Russo-German Legion wore a short green jacket with black collar and cuffs, and red piping.

H1 Cannoneer, Silesian Brigade
Students of uniform may be puzzled that the collar and cuffs are of a different colour from the epaulette straps. The explanation is that the latter are of the Silesian colours: yellow. The Brandenburg Brigade had red epaulette straps (see figure *H3*).

H2 Trumpeter, Lützow's Corps, Battery No. 14

H3 Officer, Brandenburg Brigade
These two figures call for no further comment.

NOTES

1. William O. Shanahan, *Prussian Military Reforms 1786–1813* (New York, 1945).
2. *ibid.*, p. 206.
3. *ibid.*, p. 219.
4. The various authorities differ considerably as to the strengths of the Prussian units, and even as to the names of brigade commanders. I have, on the whole, preferred F. Bourdier's statistics, which are based on those compiled by Winand Aerts, to those of Major A. F. Becke, *Napoleon and Waterloo.*
5. E. F. Henderson, *Blücher and the Uprising of Prussia against Napoleon 1806–1815*, (London/New York, 1911) p. 7.
6. *ibid.*, p. 9.
7. Krimer became surgeon of a reserve battalion and served at Dresden, Kulm, Leipzig and in the Waterloo campaign. His book, *Erinnerungen eines alten Lützower Jägers, 1795–1819*, was published at Stuttgart in 1913.
8. The 2nd Regiment of Hussars and the Saxon Chevaux-Légers.
9. Antony Brett-James, *Europe against Napoleon: The Leipzig Campaign 1813, from eyewitness accounts*, (London, 1970) p. 183.
10. Shanahan, *op. cit.*, p. 84, fn. 64.
11. Brett-James, *op. cit.*, p. 184.
12. *ibid.*, pp. 49–52.
13. *ibid.*, pp. 145–6.
14. *ibid.*, p. 218.
15. Shanahan, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
16. *ibid.*, p. 178.
17. Brett-James, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
18. *ibid.*, pp. 42–3.
19. *ibid.*, p. 281.
20. *ibid.*, p. 44.
21. Of which one (No. 32) was 'not formed'.
22. Von Kneller again distinguished himself in the pursuit entering Genappe when Napoleon was passing through in his carriage. The Emperor just had time to escape on horseback, but his baggage, a rich booty, fell into Prussian hands.
23. Brett-James, *op. cit.*, pp. 182–3.
24. A. F. Becke, *Napoleon and Waterloo. The Emperor's Campaign with the* Armée du Nord, *1815: a strategical and tactical study*, 2 vols. (London, 1914); revised and re-written edition, 1 vol. (London, 1936).
25. Presumably von Braun, who according to Becke (*op. cit.*, p. 292) commanded the artillery of IV Corps.
26. Condensed from Captain E. S. May, R.A., 'A Prussian Gunner's Adventures in 1815', *United Service Magazine* (October 1891).
27. Author of *Mémoires de Chirurgie militaire, et campagnes . . .* 4 vols., (1817).
28. Brett-James, *op. cit.*, p. 141.
29. *ibid.*, pp. 130–1.
30. *ibid.*, pp. 146–7.
31. *ibid.*, p. 148.
32. A Hessian officer.
33. Given in C. de M. [Baron Karl von Müffling], *History of the Campaign . . . in the Year 1815* (London, 1816). Müffling gives Colonel von Langen as the commander of the 8th Brigade.
34. Regiment No. 32 had been assigned to this brigade, but was as yet unformed.
35. Becke (*op. cit.*) gives von Braun as the commander of IV Corps artillery, but as the officer of that name was a general (cf. von Reuter's narrative) he would have assumed command of the artillery when Holtzendorff was hit. Since Colonel von Röhl did so, one must assume that von Braun was absent for some reason.



The Elbe National Hussar Regiment. Green with grey overalls. The mounted hussar has gold lace and light blue collar and cuffs. In 1813 the Prussian provinces, East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia, all raised National Cavalry Regiments. The Elbe National Hussar Regiment was the last to be raised. It was financed largely by the old Brandenburg landed families. It took part in the siege of Magdeburg (1814), was merged in the 10th Hussars, and fought at Wavre in 1815. (R. Knötel)

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